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Abstract: Cameroon is engaged in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
process, which emphasizes increased focus on poverty reduction in the design and 
implementation of growth and adjustment strategies. The Integrated Macroeconomic 
Model for Poverty Analysis (IMMPA) framework recently developed at the World 
Bank provides an analytical structure for supporting the PRSP process and 
quantifying poverty reduction strategies. Drawing on that framework, this paper 
provides a detailed financial social accounting matrix for the Cameroonian economy 
to serve as input into the construction of an IMMPA model for Cameroon. An 
analysis of this financial SAM shows that the dramatic fall in investment during the 
crisis period persisted in the post-devaluation growth period in the late 1990s. 
Continued low investment has implications for ongoing high unemployment rates 
and poor welfare indicators. This is illustrated by simulations based on fixed-price 
multiplier analysis, which highlight the potential growth and welfare benefits of 
increased public investment, following hypothetical debt relief and reduction of 
external debt servicing within the framework of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
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I. Introduction   
 
The persistence of poverty in a large number of developing countries that have been 
recipients of development assistance from the international community over the course of 
years has led to increased emphasis on poverty reduction by the international community, 
beginning in the late 1990s. The increased focus on poverty reduction was further motivated 
by the depth and widespread nature of poverty, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a 
large number of countries, including those that embraced the path of economic reforms and 
stabilization programs, continued to face declining living standards (De Maio, Stewart and 
Van Hoeven [1999], Easterly [2001], Hillman [2002], Fofack [2002]).
2 These efforts by the 
international community to increase the focus on poverty call for a better understanding of 
the constraints on poverty reduction in a relatively stable growth context, the transmission 
channels through which adjustment policies may affect the poor, and the possible trade-offs 
that poverty reduction may entail regarding the allocation of scarce resources and sequencing 
of policy reforms in the elaboration of poverty-reducing economic growth strategies.      
 
The Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis (IMMPA) recently developed by 
the World Bank provides an analytical framework for assessing ex-ante and a priori the 
expected welfare effects of macroeconomic reforms and policies in the design of growth and 
poverty reduction strategies (Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack [2003]). That analytical 
framework is dynamic in its approach and draws on the architecture of financial computable 
general equilibrium (FCGE) models. It emphasizes a number of issues, including the role of 
labor markets, informal employment, the transmission of policy and exogenous shocks to the 
poor, the urban-rural bias to capture the geographical dimension of poverty, the composition 
of government expenditure and credit market imperfection.
3 It was specifically developed to 
enhance poverty reduction efforts in developing countries engaged in the PRSP process.
4  
 
The IMMPA framework also emphasizes the linkage between macroeconomic and household 
surveys. Its implementation requires comprehensive data and information at the household 
and individual level, household survey data, and at the aggregate level, national accounts. 
During its implementation, national accounts data are summarized in a financial social 
accounting matrix following the classification of households and institutional agents into six 
broad income categories.
5 The financial social accounting matrix (financial SAM) provides 
an accounting record for the whole economy during a given period, and serves as a useful 
                                                 
2 For instance, despite the robust growth rates observed in Burkina Faso, notably in the post-devaluation growth period 
of the mid-1990s, poverty remains widespread, with headcount indices exceeding 45 percent in most geographical 
regions (Fofack, Monga and Tuluy [2001]). Similarly, De Maio et al. [1999] concluded that the welfare of the poor 
deteriorated during adjustment in Tanzania and Madagascar in the late 1980s, a period characterized by the 
implementation of comprehensive adjustment policies in these countries.  
3 For further details on the analytical framework and detailed structure of the IMMPA model, see Agénor, Izquierdo, 
and Fofack [2003]. Note that this paper has been circulated in draft form since 2001. 
4 PRSP stands for “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”; and countries engaged in the PRSP process include a large 
number of low-income countries with poor welfare and social indicators, unsustainable levels of external debt and good 
prospects for eligibility to debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. For further details on the background and 
progress on the implementation of the PRSP process, see Jeni Klugman [2002].     
5 These income categories include rural traded sector, rural non-traded sector, urban unskilled informal sector, urban 
unskilled formal sector, urban skilled formal sector, and capitalists. For further details on their selection see Agénor, 
Izquierdo and Fofack [2003], Chen et al. [2001].   3
guide to model building, welfare inference, and assessing the distribution of growth under 
certain restrictive conditions.  
 
Within the framework of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, Cameroon 
reached the decision point in October 2000, and is engaged in the design and implementation 
of an IMMPA model to inform the PRSP process, which underpins its future growth 
strategies.
6 This paper provides an integrated financial SAM of the Cameroonian economy 
and serves as input into the model-building process. The latest SAM of the Cameroonian 
economy focused on real sector activities and transactions, and was produced in 1998 using 
1989 data. Since then, it has not been updated, despite the significant changes in the structure 
of the economy, which has witnessed growing informal sector activities and declining 
industrial production after a long and protracted economic crisis spanning the 1980s and 
1990s. The integrated financial SAM proposed here is based on more recent data capturing 
the post-devaluation period in 1996, and provides an up-to-date coherent picture of the 
complexity of the economy. It focuses on both the real and the financial components of the 
economy, with special emphasis on the growing importance of informal sector activities. 
Drawing on the IMMPA analytical framework, it also provides an assessment of income and 
distributional effects of growth under fixed-prices multipliers assumption, and further 
insights on the functional and institutional distribution of income and flows of funds across 




The results show a Cameroonian economy characterized by a relatively large concentration 
of resources and flows in urban areas, formal and informal sectors. Together, urban formal 
and informal economy account for over 80 percent of total gross value added; of which 
formal production account for 42 percent of total aggregate value added at the national level, 
and about 54 percent of total urban production. This leaves a sizable share, about 46 percent, 
to urban informal sector’s production. Moreover, investment continues to be dramatically 
low, significantly below the pre-crisis levels, as a result of extremely high levels of final 
consumption, and costs of external debt servicing. The significant fall in investment is 
believed to be partly responsible for the persistence of high unemployment rates and poverty 
recorded in most of the 1990s and beyond, a period also characterized by a dramatic fall in 
income. Additionally, under fixed-prices multipliers specification, a simulation of policy 
experiments highlights the potential benefits of increased public investments. Indeed, under 
the assumption of a reduction of external debt servicing consistent with the HIPC initiative, 
with the relief reallocated to public investment, a significantly higher economic growth rate is 
estimated, with the benefits of growth reflected in the rapid increase in household income and 
financial assets, and especially for the “capitalist households”.                 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of some 
of the key characteristic features of the Cameroonian economy, in light of the structure of the 
prototype IMMPA model. The Cameroonian economy shows a relatively large share of 
informal sector activities, an unsustainable level of external debt and a relatively high poverty 
                                                 
6 At accession to the HIPC Decision Point in the first phase of observed track record, the staff of the IMF and the 
World Bank jointly recommends targets for the completion point (the second phase) for the net present value of the 
ratio of debt to export and the debt-service ratio based on the debt sustainability analysis. Provided that the 
performance criteria are satisfactory during the second phase, the country will then receive support under the initiative. 
For further details, see Iqbal and Kanbur [1997].  
7 CFA stands for “Communauté Financière Africaine. ”    4
incidence. It also exhibits a number of structural rigidities, including credit rationing. Section 
III provides a detailed discussion of the architecture of the Cameroonian financial SAM, 
following the IMMPA analytical framework and structure. Section IV gives an overview of a 
financial SAM-based methodology for inference under fixed-prices multipliers assumptions. 
Section V focuses on intra- and inter-sectoral linkages analysis using fixed-prices multipliers, 
and simulations of policy experiments assessing the income and growth effects of increased 
public investment. Section VI provides some concluding remarks.     
 
 
II.  Some Key Features and Characteristics of the Cameroonian Economy 
 
In addition to its PRSP status and the scope of its external debt, which provided the basis for 
its eligibility to relief under the Enhanced HIPC initiative, the Cameroonian economy 
exhibited a number of structural features and distortions in the 1980s and most of the 1990s. 
These features, most of which are of special interest to macroeconomist modelers and 
development economists, include: labor market segmentation and growing size of informal 
sector employment, chronic fiscal deficits, unsustainable external debt and accumulation of 
arrears, and persistence of urban-rural bias in the scope of poverty.
8 The accumulation of 
sizable amount of arrears to private suppliers by the government is believed to have 
compounded and exacerbated the massive accumulation of nonperforming loans in the 
banking sector. Though a wide range of economic reforms were initiated in the late 1990s, 
notably in the area of banking and finance, public expenditure management and debt, 
macroeconomic stability remains at the core of the government’s policy agenda, and will 
continue to be so in the post-HIPC era. 
 
In the past, some of these structural features were singled out to partly explain the relatively 
poor performance of the Cameroonian economy in the decade preceding the 1994 
devaluation. That decade was characterized as a lost one, as Cameroon recorded negative 
growth rates over most of the period, and witnessed a significant deterioration of living 
standards and general increase of poverty. The cycle of negative growth rates and falling 
output, including in the coffee, cocoa and oil sub-sectors, the key export products and sources 
of  foreign exchange, resulted in a major deterioration of Cameroon’s balance of payments 
and a large accumulation of external debt and domestic arrears during most of the 1980s 
period and after. The GDP declined by over 6% per annum between 1986 and 1993, 
producing a 50% fall in per capita income (World Bank [1996]).  
  
With a rapidly falling per capita income, increased rates of poverty and deterioration of living 
standards followed. The headcount index increased from 40 to over 50.5% between 1984 and 
1996. Poverty, which was already profound, continues to be widespread in rural areas, where 
the headcount index averaged over 68% in 1996 (World Bank [1998], Fambon et al. [2001]). 
Across socioeconomic groups, the deterioration of living standards observed at the national 
level has persisted. The increase of poverty was more rapid among informal sector workers 
(essentially self-employed independent workers) in the 1990s, despite the persistence of 
                                                 
8 Indeed, despite rapid increase of the headcount index in urban areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following 
economic contraction and record of successive negative growth rates, poverty remains largely a rural phenomenon, 
with rural areas accounting for over 75 percent of national poverty.       5
widespread poverty among rural producers (tradable and non tradable goods’ farmers).
9 
While formal sector workers recorded an average headcount index of about 47 percent in 
1996, the average headcount index among informal sector workers was above 76 percent.       
 
The prolonged economic recession was coupled with falling investment, and rising public 
deficits. Gross domestic investment, which accounted for over 27 percent of GDP in 1981, 
fell to less than 14 percent in 1992, representing about 50 percent decline (IMF [2002]). 
Despite the positive trend in the post-devaluation growth period of the late 1990s, gross 
investment remains significantly below the pre-crisis levels. The latest estimates indicate that 
it increased to about 18 percent of GDP in 2001.
10 Figure 1 depicts the trend of gross 
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP shown by the heavy and solid line (left scale) 
and external debt as a percentage of GDP depicted by the doted line (right scale). It is worth 
pointing out the negative association between rising external debt and declining investment; 
most notably illustrated by the wide gaps in the two curves during the crisis period and the 
narrowing gaps in the late 1990s.     
 
Despite the unfavorable political context at the time, a fall in investment of this magnitude is 
relatively high, and may have been accelerated by the perceived confiscation risks, 
potentially associated with the unsustainably high and rising public debt (both external and 
domestic) and accumulation of sizable amount of arrears to domestic suppliers. Indeed, a 
number of empirical studies have established the negative effects of external debt on private 
investment in Sub-Saharan African countries (Elbadawi, Ndulu and Ndungu [1997], Iyoha 
[2000], Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci [2002]). On the basis of a sensitivity analysis, Pattillo, 
Poirson and Ricci established a threshold of “160-170 percent of exports” beyond which 
external debt begins to have a negative impact on growth. Between 1989 and 1996, 
Cameroon external debt increased from US$4403 million to US$7809 million, representing 
190.8 percent and 381.2 percent of exports, respectively, significantly above the 170 percent 
threshold (World Bank [2002]).  
 
At the same time, the government accumulated a sizable amount of domestic debt and 
arrears, which by 1996 were estimated to about US$2858.5 million, representing over 35 
percent of GDP, about half of which was owed to financial institutions. Though arrears to 
banks and financial institutions were partly regularized in the context of the restructuring of 
the financial sector in the late 1990s, the accumulation of domestic debt remains a serious 
constraint to growth, crowding out scarce resources which otherwise would be used to 
finance private investment. With an external debt-to-export ratio at over 240 percent in 2000 
after relief under the Naples terms, and a domestic debt-to-export ratio at 45 percent, the 
Cameroon debt situation, even after relief under the Enhanced HIPC initiative will remain 
severe (at least in the medium term), compromising the prospects for increased investment, 
which is key for growth and employment creation. Indeed, the projections indicate that the 
external debt-to-export ratio remains high in 2003, well above the 170 percent threshold 
(World Bank [2002]). To account for the exceptionally high level of foreign indebtedness, 
and to allow for ex-ante assessment of extremely high debt servicing implications for growth 
                                                 
9 For further details on the geographical and socioeconomic distribution of poverty in Cameroon, see Fambon et al. 
[2001]. 
10 Most recent projections suggest that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) will reach the level of 23 percent of GDP 
only after 2014, remaining significantly below the levels of investment recorded in the early 80s (Cameroon [2003]).    6
and poverty reduction in the elaboration of the Cameroon’s IMMPA model, we emphasize 
the external sector in the real and financial components of the updated financial SAM.   
 
 
Figure 1: External Debt and Gross Domestic Investment 1980 – 2001 
 
 
  Source: World Economic Outlook (IMF [2002]).   
 
 
The sequence of negative growth rates and falling investment reduced the government’s 
prospects for resource mobilization and contributed to accumulation of fiscal deficits 
between 1985 and 1995. Expressed as percentage of GDP, the scope of public deficit 
(including grants) increased from 1.6 to 13%, which is quite high (Beckerman [2000]). The 
Government responded to the growing deficit by adopting policies to reduce public 
expenditures, particularly the size of public service wage bill through a number of measures, 
including direct cuts in civil servants’ salaries, a hiring freeze and public sector downsizing, 
privatization of public enterprises, and cuts in public expenditures allocated to social 
services.
11 In the face of the hiring freeze in the public sector and falling aggregate 
investment, unemployment increased rapidly, contributing to the aggravation of poverty, 
especially in the absence of effective social safety net programs and the government’s 
inability to ensure the delivery of essential social services to the poor and vulnerable groups. 
Urban unemployment rose sharply to reach 8% in 1996. More recent statistics suggest that 
unemployment increased to about 17% in 2001, and in the two largest cities, Yaoundé and 
Douala, it increased to 31% and 24%, respectively (Cameroon [2002], Bamou [2002]).  
                                                 
11 Real public sector wages suffered a 70 percent cut in 1993; and nominal public sector wages remained frozen in most 
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Much has been written on the possible causes of the relative poor performance of the 
Cameroonian economy over the decade preceding the devaluation of the CFA franc: an 
unfavorable international context characterized by an average 60% deterioration in the 
external terms of trade following a sharp decline of coffee, cocoa and oil prices, the key 
export products; accumulation of domestic arrears, which seriously squeezed liquidity for 
private suppliers and banks; loss of competitiveness of the Cameroonian economy and more 
generally of a number of CFA franc countries of the sub-region, partly due to overvalued 
CFA Franc; the emergence of the Dutch disease, with a dramatic fall in agricultural and 
industrial production and increased reliance on oil revenues (Blandford et al. [1995], World 
Bank [1996, 1998], Njinkeu and Bamou [2000], Amin [2002]).
12  
 
In addition, the downward adjustment of real wages in the formal public sector, which 
resulted in a 70% decline in civil servants’ salaries in 1993 may partly explain the rapid 
acceleration of urban poverty in the 1990s; to the extent that fiscal contraction (cuts in public 
spending and a hiring freeze) was at the heart of the stabilization program in a recessionary 
context of falling public and private investment. These policies led to over 12% reduction in 
the size of the civil service between 1995 and 1999, and were partly successful in reducing 
the fiscal pressure on public finance.
13 Even though the fiscal balance remained negative in 
the second half of the 1990s, it was relatively small, and since 2000, surpluses have been 
recorded, with the highest of 2.4% of GDP attained in 2001. However, in a context of 
continued low gross fixed capital formation, especially in the primary and secondary sector, 
the welfare and social costs of some of the policies embedded in the stabilization program of 
the 1990s continues to be felt. In particular, unemployment rates continued to rise, and in the 
absence of an effective unemployment benefits system, the deterioration of welfare, 
especially among poor households with no safety nets, has been a source of concern.   
 
In urban areas where most households derive their income from wages, the short-term effect 
of some of these policies were even more direct, with a number of welfare and behavioral 
consequences translated through the labor market (World Bank [1996]).
14 In a highly 
segmented labor market, informal sector activities grew rapidly to account for over 51% of 
GDP in 2000, from 41% in 1990 (Cameroon DSCN [2000]). To account for this 
characteristic feature of the Cameroonian economy, labor market segmentation, whether 
imposed by geographical factors, sector of employment, or efficiency wages considerations, 
is an important aspect of the Cameroon’s financial SAM. This financial SAM also 
emphasizes among other things, urban informal sector employment, rural tradable and non-
                                                 
12 By 1985 oil revenues and production accounted for over 65 percent of GDP in a country which up to the early 1980s 
derived over 90 percent of its GDP from agriculture; Benjamin and Devarajan [1985] emphasize the Dutch disease as a 
possible cause of the poor performance of the Cameroonian economy from the early 1980s and onward. 
13 There may be other reasons to explain the rapid increase of poverty: in the 1998 World Bank Country Assistance 
Strategy to Cameroon,  it is stated that “the post-devaluation growth rates were not high enough to absorb new entrants 
to the labor market or those loosing public sector jobs; no special employment generating program was started in either 
urban or rural areas, and there were no effective social safety nets.”   
14 It has long been documented that labor markets play an important role in the transmission process of macroeconomic 
policy shocks and structural adjustment policies (Agénor [2001], Horton et al. [1994]); and the role of labor market in 
alleviating poverty, especially in urban areas, is crucial.   8
tradable sector employment in the production and demand sides, and in the classification of 
economic agents.
15    
 
Indeed significant changes did occur in the labor market and distribution of labor force across 
the different income groups during the implementation of the stabilization program. These 
changes were marked by growing informal sector activities and employment (both skilled 
and unskilled), compensating the declining level of public sector employment.
16 Public sector 
employment (essentially public administration and excluding public enterprises), which 
accounted for over 6.1% of total labor force, and over 41% of formal sector employment in 
1992 declined to less than 4.5% of total labor force by 1997, accounting for about 36% of 
total formal sector employment. At the same time, informal sector employment, which was 
already high, increased even further, from 85.2 to about 88%. However, given the skill mix 
of the labor force engaged in informal sector activities, the extremely high rate of informal 
sector employment may be viewed as a disguised form of unemployment, especially in the 
absence of alternative employment opportunities in the formal sector. In any case, informal 
sector employment is quite high, even by developing countries standards. In Latin American 
countries where informal sector employment also grew in importance during the 1980s and 
1990s, it accounted for 50% of total employment at its peak in 1992. Similarly in Kenya and 
Ghana where informal sector employment followed a similar path in the 1990s, it accounted 
for about 60% and 45% of total labor force, respectively (Horton et al. [1994], Agénor 
[1996]).
17   
 
Informal sector employment in Cameroon has a number of other characteristic features, 
including self-employment, limited proportion of hired labor, heterogeneity of labor force, 
and ease of entry.  The relative ease of entry partly reflects ongoing wage flexibility and low 
employment security. This has a number of consequences on the structure and composition of 
labor force in that sector. Indeed, with the hiring freeze in effect in the formal public sector, 
and given the limited opportunities and alternative for formal employment, especially in a 
context of declining investment in the formal private sector, graduating students, skilled 
workers entering the labor market, and rural-to-urban migrant workers were primarily 
absorbed by the informal sector, which became even more heterogeneous. However, the 
apparent heterogeneity of labor in the informal sector, which has both skilled and unskilled 
workers, is not reflected in the wage structure. Hence we do not make a distinction between 
the different sub-categories of labor in the informal sector (on the basis of workers’ skills) in 
the construction of the financial SAM.    
 
The persistence of informal-formal wage differentials, illustrated by a large bias in the 
headcount index between these two income groups, and despite the large cut in public sector 
wages and growing size of skilled labor engaged in informal sector activities is worth noting. 
                                                 
15Labor market segmentation may also be induced by government’s intervention in the form of minimum wages and 
trade unions, which may prevent equalizing wages across sectors (Agénor [2000]). However, wages are highly flexible 
in Cameroon, despite the minimum wage legislation and trade unions have limited impact in wage-setting decisions, as 
their influence has declined significantly over time.  
16 Informal sector workers refer to self-employed who are engaged in small-scale labor-intensive activities such as 
tailoring, trading, food preparation, and trading. These workers are often regarded as unemployed as they cannot be 
included in national employment statistics, but they are often highly productive and make a significant contribution to 
national income.  
17 With informal sector employment accounting for about 90 percent of total labor force, Bangladesh is one of the 
countries which comes close to Cameroon, for further details see Devarajan, Ghanem and Thierfelder [1999].   9
As mentioned earlier, while the headcount index in the informal sector group is over 76%, a 
significantly lower rate, about 47%, is recorded in the formal sector. In the absence of 
minimum wage legislation in effect, and persistent wage differentials between formal and 
informal sector employment, the growing size of the latter may be largely driven by a decline 
of labor demand in the formal public sector, following the hiring freeze imposed in 1993 in 
response to the fiscal crisis and declining private investment, particularly in the secondary 
sector.
18 The growing size of informal sector employment in urban areas may also be partly 
attributed to the excess supply of labor, especially in urban areas, fuelled by rural-urban 
migration driven by relative wages.                
 
Labor market segmentation, which is common to most developing countries, also has a 
geographical and inter-sectoral dimension where the urban-rural and socioeconomic gaps in 
the measurement of welfare are driven by systematic income and wage differentials across 
sectors of employment and geographical regions.
19 Cameroon is not an exception to this, and 
even within a given geographical region, wage differences imposed by sector of employment 
exist and can be important, irrespective of skills. This is illustrated by the highly confined 
nature of primary sector activities, largely dominated by agricultural production in rural 
areas, where per capita income and wages are lower than the urban and national averages, 
though production falling within the realm of primary sector may be found in urban areas 
(generally in the form of industrialized agricultural production mainly by capitalists for 
exports). Also, despite the relatively low contribution of agricultural production and primary 
sector production to the aggregate GDP, an overwhelmingly large proportion of active labor 
force continues to reside in rural areas; and the relatively low contribution of primary sector 
production to aggregate output (averaging 22% over the 1990s) may be a reflection of low 
value added and productivity of the sector. In the next section, we draw on the financial SAM 
analysis to shed more light on the geographical and sectoral contribution to aggregate gross 
value added.      
 
Also, while the labor force in urban areas is largely heterogeneous (unskilled and skilled 
workers, with the latter mainly employed in the formal public and private sector, and 
capitalist group), it is more homogeneous in Cameroon’s rural areas. However, despite the 
relative homogeneity of rural labor force, differences in wage setting mechanisms exist. 
Unskilled workers can have significantly large disparities in wages and income depending on 
the nature of their employment (tradable versus non tradable agricultural production).
20 
Though smaller in size, the tradable group has a higher per capita income and a relatively 
large contribution to aggregate output, a reflection of higher wages and value added.
21 By 
contrast, the relatively low contribution of non tradable agricultural production to overall 
aggregate output is reflected in the group’s overall income, which is about the lowest and not 
commensurate with its size, about the largest income group in Cameroon. We fully take into 
account the segmented nature of the labor market in the construction of Cameroon’s financial 
SAM. In particular, we make a clear distinction between urban and rural production in the 
                                                 
18 Prior to the imposition of hiring freeze, public sector employment accounted for over 75 percent of total formal 
employment in Cameroon.  
19 Indeed, most studies of labor markets in developing countries indicate much segmentation, rigidity and 
unemployment (Ndulu [1991]). 
20 Non tradable rural agricultural sectors are essentially engaged in subsistence agricultural production, and a large 
share of their income (wages) is derived as imputed values of home consumption of own production. 
21 This group is engaged in the production of a number of products for exports, including coffee, cocoa, timber, banana, 
and cotton.   10
construction of current and capital accounts of economic agents, along the lines of the 
prototype IMMPA framework (Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack [2003]).   
 
Cameroon reversed the trend of negative growth rates in 1995 when, at about 3%, GDP 
growth was positive for the first time in over 10 years (World Bank [1996]). The growth 
process continued in most of the second half of the 1990s. Between 1995 and 2001, 
Cameroon achieved average growth rates of about 4.7% (IMF [2002]). Annex I provides a 
summary of key economic and social indicators between 1981 and 2001. These indicators 
emphasize most notably national income growth, fiscal and external accounts. Despite the 
resumption of positive growth rates, Cameroon continues to face difficulties in its attempts to 
curb rising unemployment and poverty. Poverty remains widespread and unemployment has 
been growing with a rising trend: the latest estimates from government officials indicate an 
average unemployment rate of 17% by end-2001, representing a 13% increase since 1993 
(Bamou [2002]).  
 
Under this unfavorable trend in welfare, attaining the government’s objective of halving 
unemployment by 2010 may appear as a serious challenge, especially given the structure of 
the economy, which during the post-devaluation growth period has been skewed. Indeed, the 
post-devaluation growth period of the second half of the 1990s was largely driven by 
agricultural production and services. These sectors have low prospects for employment 
creation in the Cameroonian context, where subsistence agriculture, characterized by sizable 
home consumption of own production and an extremely low forward linkages index, 
continues to account for most of the rural production. This apparent trend in the growth 
process, with a shift toward primary and tertiary sector production and a decline in the 
secondary sector’s contribution is not consistent with the government’s poverty reduction 
strategy, which emphasizes industrial production as the engine of growth and employment 
creation (Cameroon [2003] and World Bank [2000a]).
22  
 
The vulnerability of the Cameroonian economy, and particularly its external position, is 
further exacerbated by the fact that exports have remained concentrated in few commodities. 
Since 1995, timber, coffee, cocoa and oil exports have consistently accounted for over 73% 
of total export revenues, on average. In the absence of further diversification, negative terms 
of trade shocks from declines in commodity prices and/or falling volume of production could 
have devastating effects on growth and poverty, even with Cameroon’s access to relief under 
the HIPC initiative. Under these conditions, and in light of the consistently declining trade 
surplus observed during most of the post-devaluation growth period, it is highly likely that 
Cameroon will continue to rely on external financing.
23 In particular, the projections indicate 
that the net present value of total debt after assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative 
will remain high, with debt service-to-government-revenue ratio falling below 100 percent 
only after the year 2007, notwithstanding the declining trend (World Bank [2000b]).
24 The 
architecture of the proposed financial SAM emphasizes the external sector and real and 
                                                 
22 Between 1990 and 2000, the contribution of the secondary sector to aggregate output and GDP declined by 34%; it 
now represent about 21% of GDP, from 32% 10 years ago. At the same time, the contribution of the tertiary sector 
increased by 21.1%, from 46.9 to over 56.8%, owing mainly to the growing share of informal sector activities. 
23 Since 1995, the trade surplus recorded in the post-devaluation export boom has been declining, and between 1995 
and 2000, it fell to US$161.7 million from over US$667.2 million (Cameroon, DSCN [2000]).  
24 The projections indicate that the net present value of total debt after assistance under the enhanced HIPC will 
decrease from about US$3.5 billion to US$2.7 billion between 2003 and 2008. During the same period, debt service-to-
government-revenue ratio will decrease from about 147% to 80%.     11
financial flows between Cameroon and the rest of the world. It also emphasizes inter- and 
intra-sectoral flows of funds and the accumulation process to shed more light on the structure 
of the Cameroonian economy and to allow for ex-ante simulations of growth and income 
effects of increased public investment and recurrent expenditures.  
 
III.  An IMMPA-Based Financial SAM for the Cameroonian Economy  
 
Cameroon’s financial SAM draws on the prototype IMMPA framework and can be viewed as 
a combination of the flow-of-funds (FOF) and social accounting matrix (SAM) approaches to 
macroeconomics.
25 It is comprehensive and provides details of the real-financial transactions 
and flows that occurred between economic agents during 1995/1996 fiscal year.
26 These 
transactions and flows are in current prices. They are underpinned by 59 accounts 
summarized into nine key macroeconomic aggregate accounts: changes in assets and 
liabilities, capital accounts of economic agents, exports and imports, offers and demands for 
composite goods, production for domestic markets, sectors of production, current accounts of 
economic agents, and production factors. This structure of accounts draws on the IMMPA’s 
scheme, particularly the production sectors and household groups. Annex II provides the 
details of the Financial Social Accounting Matrix.     
 
Cameroon’s financial SAM departs from past tradition where social accounting matrices 
focused exclusively on the real side of the economy (Pyatt and Round [1990], Easterly 
[1989]). It covers the real and financial variables of the economy. Its upper left corner 
(accounts 1-36) concerns real variables, while its lower left and right corner (accounts 37-59) 
concern the financial variables and flows between agents. The linkages between the real and 
financial aspects of the economy are provided by public and private savings shown as a 
diagonal matrix in the lower left-hand part of the financial SAM. The savings are presented 
in the form of flows in the capital accounts and changes in assets and liabilities accounts of 
economic agents. Savings may be viewed as equivalent to changes in net worth, where net 
worth includes both physical capital and net financial assets. 
 
The rows of this financial SAM account for the income (resources), and the columns account 
for expenditures (uses) by economic agents. Reading across the row of the current accounts 
of the public sector (row 14), we get public value added, indirect taxes (consumption and 
production taxes, imports and exports) minus subsidies, and direct taxes from the private 
sector, transfers from the rest of the world, and other transfers from the Central Bank to the 
Government. Altogether, the sum across row 14 provides the aggregate current account of the 
public sector or the total resources that accrued to the public accounts during 1995-1996. 
These resources are estimated at US$1.67 billion, representing about 18% of GDP. Taxes 
(direct and indirect) account for over 65% of the total, of which direct taxes raised from 
individual income represent about 10%. These resources from direct taxes are lower than 
taxes levied on imports and exports, which altogether accounts for over 15% of aggregate 
revenues. Though relatively low, this contribution of direct taxes to fiscal revenues in the 
                                                 
25 The FOF methodology emphasizes the equality of sources and uses of funds distinguished between current and 
capital accounts. 
26 The real part of the SAM was constructed using Supply and Use Table, Integrated Economic Accounts and other 
miscellaneous data from the Cameroon’s Department of Statistics and National Account (DSCN [1997, 1998, 1999]); 
while financial data were mainly obtained from documents published by the Central Bank of Central Africa’s countries 
(BEAC [1997], COBAC [1995, 1996]).   12
Cameroonian context is consistent with low-income country standards, where direct taxation 
has been known to play a limited role, partly as a result of the narrow tax base (Burgess and 
Stern [1993]).  
 
The relatively low level of resources mobilized from direct taxes is partly exacerbated by the 
rising, and sizable scope of informal sector activities, which results de facto in the loss of 
revenues. Urban informal sector activities account for over 33 percent of aggregate income 
(sum across rows 16-20). Total income generated from urban informal sector production is 
about twice the income generated from rural production (tradable and non tradable sectoral 
production combined) and over five times the income generated from public sector 
production.
27 The preeminence of informal sector activities and production, a key 
characteristic feature of the Cameroonian economy, is further illustrated by the sectoral 
composition of value added and production at factor costs (see Table 1 below). Urban 
informal sector production accounts for over 36 percent of gross value added; a share that is 
even higher than the value added contributed by the private sector. And the higher sectoral 
production share of the latter (41.5%), is largely attributed to the size of intermediate inputs, 
which account for over 54 percent of the total.  
 
 
Table 1: Sectoral production at factor costs  

























  Unskilled labor (wages)         1 231           116               572              473              324             2 716    
 Skilled  labor  (wages)               0              0                    0                533              323                857    
 Capital  (profits)           369              241            2 639            1 861              119             5 230    
 Output  taxes               0                  3                   1                33                  0                   37    
Gross Value added
29        1 600               361            3 212            2 900              766             8 840    
Intermediate inputs           276              410            1 823            3 318              316             6 142    
= Production at factor costs        1 876              771            5 035            6 218           1 082           14 982    
Share in total production at 
factor costs (%) 
      12.52          5.15         33.61         41.50          7.22        100.00 
Share in total gross value 
added (%) 
18.10  4.09 36.34 32.81  8.67  100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
The use of intermediate inputs is much lower in the rural production, both in the non traded 
and traded sectors, which account for 4.5% and 6.5% of the total intermediate inputs uses 
across sectors, respectively. The limited use of intermediate inputs in the rural production 
                                                 
27 Yet despite this relatively large share of informal sector production, urban unskilled informal households are not 
subject to income taxes. 
28 Following the 50 percent devaluation in 1994, and subsequent adjustments in the exchange rates, the new parity 
between US dollar and the CFA Franc was established at 502 CFA Francs for a US dollar in 1996. 
29 The gross value added is estimated by the sum across wages, return on investment (profits) and output taxes.   13
may reflect the rudimentary level of technology used in the agricultural sector, a sector which 
remains largely labor intensive. The intensity of labor is even more pronounced in the non 
traded agricultural production sector, where unskilled labor wages alone account for most of 
the total value added estimated to over 76%. The remainder of value added is accounted for 
mainly by profits from capital investment estimated to be about 23%, and taxes on output, 
whose share as a percentage of aggregated value added is negligible.  
 
By contrast, the rural traded production sector has a different structure. The labor wage 
contribution to gross value added is significantly lower, at 32%. The larger value added share 
in this sector is mainly accounted for by profits and returns on capital, altogether estimated to 
over 66 percent, a marked difference, representing about three times the share of non traded 
agricultural production. However, rural traded production remains very low in comparison to 
the overall: with a contribution of about 5 percent to total production and 4 percent to the 
aggregate value added, and its sectoral share is even lower.
30 The relatively large share of 
labor force employed in rural non traded production contrasts the low contribution of this 
sector to aggregate production, established at less than 13 percent. The high share of labor 
costs in value added, and the much lower productivity of the sector may reflect the non 
competitive nature of the Cameroonian agriculture.     
 
Likewise, public sector production has one of the lowest value added, about 9% of the 
aggregate value added. It is lower than the private sector’s share, about 33%, and the 
informal sector’s share, over 36% (see Table 1 above). Most likely, this may reflect the fact 
that the public sector value added is essentially made up of wage outlays, as it represents the 
operating surplus plus depreciation of public entities engaged in the production process. Most 
value added income accruing to the public sector is accounted for by wages of skilled and 
unskilled labor which together represents over 84% of the total. Strikingly, public sector 
value added from profits and returns on capital is extremely low, about 1.3% of public 
production, despite continuing involvement of government in the production process and 
mainly in the more capital-intensive industries. This low share of value added may also 
reflect the level of productivity of a number of public enterprises in the aftermath of the 
protracted economic crisis, some of which suffered from losses and arrears.
31      
 
Reading down the columns for the public sector current accounts (column 14), we get current 
expenditures such as government consumption, transfers and interest payments. Government 
savings estimated at over US$144.5 million, less than 2% of GDP, is the balancing item. 
Spending on public sector production and transactions with the rest of the world, together, 
account for most of the current expenditure of the public sector (80%). The latter includes 
interest payments on foreign debt, and its relatively large share in the aggregate current 
expenditures in the form of public transfers to the rest of the world reflects the high and 
unsustainable level of external debt. Note that by 1994, the stock of foreign debt was slightly 
higher than the GDP, representing exactly 100.7% of GDP and 382.2% of exports revenues. 
At the same time, external debt service accounted for over 5% of GDP.  
                                                 
30 The relatively low level of this sector of production and its contribution to the gross value added may also reflect the 
size of the sector, which is confined to rural areas and involved in the production of a limited number of products.  
31 In the first round of reforms undertaken by Cameroonian authorities in the early 1990s, the clearance of domestic 
arrears focused on arrears owed to commercial banks and financial institutions; this program was expanded in the late 
1990s to include clearance of arrears owed to public utilities companies and nonfinancial private corporations. For 
further details see World Bank [1998].   14
 
The high external debt servicing may be viewed as a diversion of scarce public resources, 
which otherwise would be used to deliver essential social services to the poor and to finance 
public investments needed for growth and poverty reduction. On the other hand, public 
transfers to households (both urban and rural households), which represent the third largest 
expenditure item of the public sector shrank significantly and by 1995, was at its lowest 
level. Together, transfers to urban and rural households account for a little over 8% of total 
current expenditures, representing 1.5% of GDP (see column 14 of the financial SAM in 
Annex II).
32 With rural households receiving exactly 2.88% of the total amount, with most of 
it directed to urban households. This implies that out of US$100 of public transfers to 
households, over US$97 benefits households in urban areas. This urban-rural bias in public 
spending allocation is perverse, given the large concentration of the population, and 
particularly the poor, in rural areas, and may partly explain the persistence of widespread 
poverty in rural areas and overtime inertia in the urban-rural poverty gaps.         
 
The urban-rural bias reflected in the poverty gaps and public spending allocation is also 
captured by the disparity in the overall consumption and demands of goods and services (see 
Table 2). This Table provides estimates of the composition of sectoral demands at market 
prices. The rural share (tradable and non tradable) of total demand is about 16%, of which 
over 11% is due to the rural sector engaged in the production of non traded goods. By all 
standards, this share is extremely low, especially given the scope and size of the labor force 
engaged in rural production.
33 In contrast, most of the demand for goods and services is from 
urban areas, which accounts for over 84% of total aggregated demands, hence, reinforcing 
the urban-rural bias. Moreover, most of the demands in urban areas are from the private 
formal sector, which alone accounts for about half of the total. The demand emanating from 
the urban informal sector, which accounts for about 30% of the overall aggregate demand, is 
the second largest share. Demand emanating from the public sector and rural traded sectors 
are much lower, representing about 6 and 5% of the aggregate demand, respectively.   
 
Invariably, and irrespective of the sector of production, demands are driven more by final 
consumption, and less by investment motives. Consumption accounts for over 80% of 
aggregate demand. Exports, which represent absorption by non residents, account for about 
13% of the total, leaving the lowest share of all to investment, which accounts for only 7% of 
total aggregate demand. Though relatively low, this share is consistent with the declining 
value of gross fixed capital formation recorded in most of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Household and intermediate consumption comprise the bulk of the share. Altogether, 
households and intermediate consumption account for over 75% of total aggregate demand, 
of which household consumption accounts for about 40%. 
 
The distribution of household consumption is not uniform across sectors and geographical 
regions. The welfare effects of unequal distribution of resources are further highlighted by a 
bias in the sectoral and geographical composition of household consumption. Despite their 
relatively small size, urban households enjoyed over 73% of total household consumption. 
                                                 
32 This level of social transfers to households is extremely low, even by low-income countries standards, and not 
commensurate with the scope of poverty and challenges facing the poor and vulnerable groups in Cameroon. For 
instance, expressed as a percentage of total expenditures, social expenditures accounted for about 24% in Ethiopia, 
20% in Uganda, 35% in Ecuador, and 36% in Bulgaria.  
33 Despite the prevailing rural-to-urban migration trend, a large share of population continues to reside in rural areas.    15
Even taking into account home consumption of own production, which may not have been 
fully accounted for in the estimate of household consumption in rural areas, this bias remains 
important, and may partly explain the large urban-rural income and poverty gaps, especially 
to the extent that the poverty indicators are estimated from the household per capita 
expenditure aggregates (Fambon et al. [2001]).
34   
 
Table 2: Composition of demand by Sector at market prices 


























  Household consumption  1 771  32  2 088  2 710  165  6 766 
  Government consumption  0  0 0 0  889  889 
  Intermediate consumption  588  432  2 217  2 878  27  6 142 
  Private investment by origin  -444  -81 763 739 0  977 
  Public investment by origin  0 0  0 252 2  254 
  Exports  6  447  0  1 731  0  2 184 
Aggregate demand by sector
35  1 921  830  5 068  8 310  1 083  17 212 
As a share of aggregate 
demand across all sectors  11.16  4.82 29.44 48.28  6.29  100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
 
 
The high rate of consumption puts a number of sectors in a vulnerable position, and 
particularly the deficit prone ones facing disinvestments and rapid depreciation of their 
capital stock. Most vulnerable of all is the rural non traded sector, which has an extremely 
high consumption share and a large deficit. The high deficit of this sector is illustrated by the 
negative value of investment, reflecting changes in the capital stock after valuation effects. 
Moreover, to the extent that no public investment is allocated to this sector, the reduction in 
the stock of private capital further exacerbates the overall depreciation of aggregate capital 
stock in this sector. 
 
Unlike the non traded rural sector, which produces mainly for domestic consumption, the 
export share of aggregate demand in the rural traded sector is important, and reflects the 
rising trend of export revenues. The prospect of continued large increases in export gains 
were hampered by the depreciation of the capital stock, however, though of smaller 
magnitude. At over US$7.96 million, the depreciation of privately owned capital represents 
about 18% of total consumption and about 10% of aggregate demand at the sectoral level. 
Given the low level of household consumption in the rural traded sector, the difficulties of 
this sector may have been amplified by the high costs of intermediate consumption. Indeed, 
earnings from rural traded goods barely equal the value of total intermediate consumption.  
 
                                                 
34 The value of home consumption of own production in rural areas may be more than offset by the valuation of own 
occupied imputed rent if the latter is not accounted for in urban areas, therefore limiting the scope of omission bias.  
35 Aggregate demands are estimated as the sum of total consumption, intermediate and final consumption by 
households, government, total investment (private and public) and export.     16
In the face of net depreciation of gross capital stock, especially in rural areas, most 
investment accrued to the informal and private sector in urban areas. Total gross investment 
is estimated at about US$1.2 billion, representing about 14% of GDP. Compared to the early 
1980s, where gross investment was estimated to be in the range of 27% of GDP, this level of 
investment is quite low; and with public savings at 2% of GDP, most of it is financed by 
private capital, which accounts for about 80% of total investment. Public investment, which 
accounts for the remaining 20%, is directed primarily to urban areas, which receives over 
99% of the total. The high share of consumption and extremely low level of capital formation 
is a serious constraint to long-term growth and poverty reduction. It may have contributed to 
increased debt burden, especially because a rapid depreciation of gross capital formation 
negatively impacts on the level of output which otherwise would be used to service the loans.          
 
On the financial side of the SAM, the key items are summarized under the capital accounts of 
economic agents (accounts 37-47) and changes in assets and liabilities (accounts 48-59). The 
changes in assets and liabilities are measured in terms of flows. In the columns, they 
represent gross asset accumulation of the sector, typically physical and financial assets. 
However, given that the development of the financial market is still in its embryonic stage in 
Cameroon, the model assumes that the acquisition of securities and public bonds is restricted 
to financial institutions such as commercial banks.
36 In the rows of the financial SAM, the 
capital accounts provide details on the sources and distribution of resources owed by 
economic agents. These resources are essentially made up of the sum of savings and 
borrowings. The latter includes borrowings from financial institutions, foreign borrowings by 
public and private institutions, changes in ownership of capital shares, foreign reserves and 
holdings of currency.  
 
Recall that savings by foreign residents, shown at the intersection of column 47 (capital 
accounts of economic agents) and row 15 (current accounts of economic agents), is the 
balancing item between external receipts and payments. The value of savings, which also 
corresponds to the current account of the balance of payments, is negative and equivalent to 
about 3.4% of GDP in absolute value terms. This negative value of savings by foreign 
residents corresponds to a current account surplus in the balance of payments. This surplus 
reflects a significant improvement of the trade balance following the devaluation of the CFA 
Franc in 1994. Indeed, from a low base in the years preceding the devaluation, exports 
increased by over 40 percent between 1994 and 1995, from US$1761.3 million to US$2075.6 
million, representing 20 and over 24% of GDP, respectively. This improvement of the current 
account balance is significant, especially given the scope of the deficit in the early 1990s, 
when it reached over 7.7% of GDP (Cameroon [2000]).           
 
The current account surplus is more than offset by the deficit of the capital account, however. 
At about US$356 million, net capital inflows (public and private) represent about 4% of 
GDP. A net inflow of resources and capital this large reflects the degree of reliance and 
dependence of Cameroon on external financing, and continued large financing gaps, 
especially in a context of a dramatically low level of domestic saving, a constraint to the 
financing of investment. The current account surplus of 3.4% of GDP, and capital account 
balance of about 4% of GDP, explain the relatively strong reserve position. At about 40% of 
bank financial assets, the level of foreign reserves represents over 0.35 months of imports, a 
                                                 
36 The Cameroon Stock Exchange was officially inaugurated in April 2003. The embryonic stage of the financial 
market is not specific to Cameroon, however; it is indeed one of the key characteristics of low income countries.   17
net improvement from the pre-devaluation period where assets barely accounted for 0.1 
month of imports (World Bank [1998]).      
    
The “rest of the world” capital account has negative savings; all the other economic agents, 
including the rural traded and non traded sectors, have positive savings. However, savings 
rates are variable across economic agents, as reflected in the marginal propensity to save. 
This marginal propensity to save varies from 1 percent in the rural non traded production 
sector to over 60% for commercial banks (see Figure 2). It is relatively high for capitalist 
households and nonfinancial corporations, which allocated about 30 and 41% to savings, 
respectively.
37 Commercial banks have the highest marginal propensity to save, reflecting the 
restrictive policy of limited credit expansion in the post-devaluation growth period to contain 
inflationary pressures.
38 The savings by rural households engaged in the production of traded, 
non traded, informal and public sector production are lower than the national average 
depicted by the straight horizontal line. The large variance of savings across sectors is 
reflected in the relatively high range of the marginal propensity to save.  
 
At the macroeconomic level, the low saving rates, particularly public sector savings, which 
fall below the already low national average and accounts for less than 2% of GDP, has 
implications for investments and economic growth, and may partly explain the poor 
performance of the Cameroonian economy in most of the 1980s and beyond. Indeed, there is 
strong theoretical and empirical evidence corroborating a positive and strong association 
between public savings and growth (Krieckhaus [2002]).
39 Assessing the association between 
public savings and growth in a sample of 32 developing countries, Krieckhaus found that the 
sub-sample of countries with high public saving rates averaging over 8% of GDP enjoyed 
economic growth rates roughly double that of the other sub-sample of countries with public 
savings averaging less than 1% of GDP. The study found the direction and strength of the 
association to be robust over time. 
 
Empirical evidence on the implications of public savings on growth and the direction of 
causality have been established in a number of countries. Looking at the medium term trend, 
a unidirectional causality between savings and growth could be established in Brazil, for 
instance, where the increased costs of servicing external debt due to rising interest rates in 
international capital markets led to a dramatic collapse of public savings, which in turn 
resulted in lower investment and growth rates, and was believed to be responsible for the 
Brazilian fiscal crisis and economic debacle of the 1980s (Carneiro and Werneck [1993] and 
Krieckhaus [2002]).
40 Without ruling out the possibility of dual causality and covariation 
between public savings and growth, the costs of increased debt servicing and falling public 
savings for economic growth may be even more important in Cameroon, especially as a 
                                                 
37 Non financial corporations refers to public and private enterprises involved in the production of goods and services 
other than commercial banks and insurance companies. 
38 The limited credit expansion, which was the cornerstone of monetary policy during the post-devaluation period, 
continued to be in effect during most of the 1990s, and is believed to be largely responsible for the excess liquidity 
which now characterizes bank portfolios in Cameroon.   
39 The potential benefits of large public savings are significant: economic theory suggests that increasing public savings 
should lead to rising overall national savings, investments, and ultimately economic growth rates. 
40 In a study investigating the determinants of the Brazilian economic crisis in the 1980s, Carneiro and Werneck [1993] 
concluded that the collapse of public savings preceded the dramatic fall in investment, which was singled out as the 
most important immediate causes of the slowdown in economic growth.     18
significant deterioration of the poor state of infrastructure was also observed during the crisis 


























































  Source: Authors’ calculations.   
 
 
The distribution of credits in the changes in assets and liabilities accounts across economic 
agents in the financial side of the SAM shows an improvement in the capital accounts of 
economic agents. The sum of saving and gross borrowing is positive across all economic 
agents, reflecting the positive saving and credit allocation. However, the flows of domestic 
credits to the economy (public and private credits), which is US$75.1 million (equivalent to 
less than 0.8% of GDP) is unevenly distributed. Most of it is allocated to nonfinancial 
companies and the general government, which together receive well over 83% of domestic 
credit allocated by commercial banks. Credit to households account for about 16.7 percent of 
total credit and less than 1% of GDP. The geographical distribution of domestic credit 
allocation is also biased. Rural households engaged in the production of traded and non 
traded goods received less than 1 percent of total credit allocated by commercial banks and 
financial institutions (see col. 53 of the financial SAM in Annex II).     
 
The low saving rate, particularly among the rural households, has implications on the 
distribution of asset ownership and accumulation (physical and financial asset accumulation). 
Most of the physical and financial asset accumulation accrues to non financial companies and 
                                                 
41 Tracking the direction of causality between public saving and growth in the case of Cameroon where both variables 
have been subject to large fluctuations, will be an important research topic on its own.  
42 Note that capitalists refer to households which primarily derive their income from investment in capital shares and 
physical capital; whereas nonfinancial companies refer to formal enterprises, which unlike commercial banks and 
insurance institutions are not engaged in financial transactions and operations.       19
capitalists households. With the highest marginal propensity to save, commercial banks and 
non financial corporations, and capitalist households account for over 62% of total assets 
accumulated. At the same time, traded and non traded rural households, which have the 
lowest marginal propensity to save, account for less than 1.5% of the total assets. Figure 3 
below provides the distribution of assets across economic agents. For all practical purposes, 
the central bank and public sector assets are combined.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of physical and financial assets accumulation  


























  Source: Authors’ calculations.     
 
The wide disparity in asset ownership accumulation and structure, which is captured by the 
urban-rural bias could potentially inhibit the overall growth and poverty reduction prospects 
(Fofack [2002]). This is particularly important for the case of Cameroon, especially as asset 
accumulation is financed either through savings (public and private) or borrowing from the 
monetary systems (private sector and foreigners), and given the policy of limited credit 
expansion and access to external borrowing of the private sector, the acquisition of assets and 
financial wealth is primarily financed through savings. Overall and irrespective of economic 
agents, more than 82% of physical and financial assets acquired by households are financed 
by domestic savings. The rate is even higher in rural areas where 99% of total assets acquired 
by the non traded sector are directly financed by households savings and less than 1% of it is 
accounted for by domestic credit issued by commercial banks. Similarly, domestic credit to 
the rural traded sector is relatively low; and over 96% of assets acquisition in that sector is 
financed by household savings. The only exception concerns nonfinancial private companies, 
which partly finance the net increase of their assets with capital share, at a rate of 18.1%. 
Though savings also finances a large proportion of asset acquisition in urban areas, the 
urban-rural bias in the sources of financial and physical assets accumulation remain   20
important. The more stringent access to domestic credit in rural areas may be partly due to 
low degree of monetization of rural economy.
43     
 
Except in a few cases (urban formal unskilled households, urban skilled and capitalist 
households, and commercial banks), the changing structure of assets is mainly characterized 
by a net increase and accumulation of capital goods. Capital goods acquisitions accounts for 
over 81% of total aggregated household assets acquisition across all economic agents (see 
Annex IV). Surprisingly, the acquisition of capital goods valued at market prices is high in a 
number of sectors, especially the ones which reduced their holding of fiduciary currencies 
and deposits to commercial banks. This is especially the case for rural traded and non traded 
households, urban informal sector and non financial companies. The largest accumulation of 
capital goods is accounted for by two sectors: non financial companies which account for 
more than 60% of the total, and the central government, which accounts for over 20% (see 
Annex IV). The urban private sector benefited most from the accumulation of capital goods 
and public investment, receiving over 99% of total investment. The concomitant reduction of 
currency holding and deposits to commercial banks on one hand and increase accumulation 
of capital goods on the other hand may also be viewed as a strategy for portfolio 
diversification in an environment of limited credit expansion and money growth.  
 
In the urban formal sector (skilled and unskilled households, capitalist households, and 
commercial banks), the changing structure of assets is dominated by acquisition of capital 
shares. Capitalist households have large capital shares, about twice the aggregate value of 
capital across all economic agents. The low value of the aggregated capital share across all 
other economic agents is due to the large reduction in the holding of capital shares and 
equities by the central government. In absolute value terms, the reduction of capital share 
owed by the government represents more than 32% of national aggregated capital resources 
accumulated over the reference period. Though relatively high, this reduction of capital share 
owed by the public sector may be inscribed in a much broader framework of divestiture of 
public enterprises.
44 The monetary system has the most diversified financial asset structure. 
Commercial banks accumulated credit to the public and private sectors, accounting for over 
45% of their total resources. They also increased their ownership of capital share to about 
53.5% of the total; and short-term foreign assets in the form of international reserves to about 
40% of the total. Note that the increase of financial assets in the form of capital shares, credit 
and reserves accruing to commercial banks was partly facilitated by a drastic reduction in the 
scope of government bond holdings and access to external financial resources.       
 
 
IV.  An IMMPA-Based Financial SAM Model for Inference under Fixed-Price 
Multiplier  
 
This section provides a framework for inferring the functional distribution of income, and the 
growth and accumulation process from the Cameroon financial SAM using fixed-price 
multiplier analysis. Fixed-price multiplier analyses are static models for short-term inference. 
                                                 
43 More recently, a number of local institutions in the form of formal and informal cooperative have been providing 
access to financing in rural areas through development of micro-credit schemes, as alternative or substitute to low 
coverage of rural areas by traditional commercial banks and financial institutions.  
44 For instance, in the years following the devaluation of the CFA Franc, the two largest transport entities and agro-
businesses were privatized; and the privatization program was designed to be expanded to cover public utilities, 
commercial banks and other non financial corporations. For further details, see World Bank [1998].    21
They are based on a number of hypotheses; in particular, they assume that transactions occur 
at non-equilibrium prices, and prices remain fixed, owing to excess capacity; functional 
relationships are taken to be linear in the financial SAM column; and the models are 
essentially demand-driven, as supply-side is not a constraint on economic activities. 
Naturally, the first assumption implies that prices and wages do not move immediately and 
automatically to clear the market, and inferences are based on quantities; only activity levels 
may vary. The second assumption implies that the substitution between imports and domestic 
production in the commodity columns may not be possible, especially given that the 
production function follows Leontief specifications. 
 
Despite these restrictions, fixed-price multiplier analyses have been used extensively to study 
the distribution of income (Roland-Holst and Sancho [1992]), and the short-term effects of 
fiscal policies (Whalley and Hillaire [1987]). More recently, they were used to assess the 
sources of growth and sectoral distribution of resources (Arndt, Jensen and Tarp [2000]). In 
this Section, we draw on these models to assess the functional and institutional distribution of 
income and growth, the effects on saving and production, financial assets and accumulation 
processes, following shocks on exogenous accounts.
45 We focus particularly on the growth 
and income effects of increased public investment and capital expenditures. 
 
The growth and income effects following the shocks are measured on endogenous accounts 
and variables (see Annex V-A for endogenous accounts) considered as response. The 
variation in the income, and activities levels of these variables are explained by changes in 
the exogenous accounts, through multipliers. A practical use of these models in policy 
analysis requires a prior subdivision of all the real and financial sectors accounts of the SAM 
into two mutually exclusive classes of exogenous and endogenous accounts. In our attempt to 
infer on the functional and institutional distribution of income, saving, growth and the 
accumulation process, from the prototype financial SAM of the IMMPA framework, we 
identify 15 exogenous accounts subdivided into 3 exogenous current accounts, 3 exogenous 
capital accounts, and 9 exogenous changes in assets and liabilities accounts (see Annex V-B). 
These exogenous variables emphasize the government and rest-of-the world accounts. This 
reflects the nature of the shock, which simulates the short-run growth and income effects of 
increased public investment and capital expenditures following hypothetical reduction in the 
stock of debt and external debt services within the framework of the HIPC initiative. The 
choice of this scenario reflects the fact that Cameroon’s external debt is extremely high and it 
is believed that interest payments might have hampered its growth prospects.      
 
The simulated growth and income effects of shocks on exogenous accounts are measured on 
the response of endogenous accounts. These endogenous accounts include the remuneration 
of factors (in the IMMPA classification, this includes unskilled rural labor, skilled and 
unskilled urban labor), production of economic agents, household income and income 
accruing to non financial companies, and changes in financial assets. Annex V provides the 
details of the multipliers matrix (Annex V-A focuses on the sub-set of endogenous accounts, 
and Annex V-B focuses on exogenous accounts). The linkage between exogenous and 
endogenous accounts is provided by a fixed-prices multipliers model in a functional form 
specified by the set of equations below. 
                                                 
45 Functional distribution of income records the division of income between production factors (wage and property 
income) and institutional distribution of income focuses on the spatial distribution of income, particularly urban/rural 
dimension, but also along a number of other institutional classifications.   22
 








n x y A y + =                (1) 
 
where 
) , ( f r
n y  represents the vector of combined real and financial ( ) f r,  endogenous account 
totals and 
) , ( f r
n x  the matrix of combined real and financial ( ) f r,  exogenous account totals.
46 
) , ( f r
n A  defines the matrix of average expenditure propensities. This last matrix can be 
obtained by dividing a particular element in any of the endogenous accounts by the total for 
the column account in which the element occurs. After some algebraic rearrangements, 
equation (1) can be rewritten as:  
     






n x A I y ∗ − =
−             (2) 
 
where 




n M A I = −
−  is the multiplier matrix also known as the Leontief inverse.
47 
Equation (2) can also be expressed in compact form. Hence, using the reduced form of the 
Leontief inverse, it is represented by equation (3) below.  
 






n x M y =
48                     (3) 
 
Column  iof the multipliers matrix  a M shows the global effects of all endogenous activity 
levels induced by an exogenous unit inflow accruing to i, after allowing for all 
interdependent feedbacks to run their course. The changes in the Leontief inverse following 
the shocks on exogenous accounts are the basis for inferring on growth and income 
distribution captured by inherent adjustment of endogenous accounts. Negative terms of trade 
shocks, rising costs of external debt servicing, and accumulation of arrears to domestic 
suppliers are believed to have negatively impacted on the growth process in the late 1980s 
and most of the 1990s in Cameroon. By way of illustration, we run a scenario to simulate the 
growth and income effects of a 55% debt reduction, with the hypothetical relief mainly 
reallocated to public investment. Note that the hypothetical 55% reduction of Cameroon 
external debt would bring its stock of debt to about 170% of exports, the sustainable 
threshold. The results of the simulation are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
V.  Growth and Welfare Inference under Fixed-Price Multipliers 
 
To further analyze the structural and inter-sectoral linkages of the Cameroonian economy, we 
generate the matrix multipliers from the flows of resources into each of the endogenous 
                                                 
46 The above reduced form of the SAM Multipliers is adapted from Roland-Host and Sancho [1995].  
47 It is assumed that the multipliers matrix or “Leontief Inverse” has only non negative entries, for negative entries will 
be difficult to interpret, implying for instance that some final demands have negative impact on gross output. The 
general restrictions on the cells of the “Leontief Inverse” matrix are provided by the Hawkins-Simmon conditions 
(Hawkins [1949]). According to these conditions, the diagonal elements of the multipliers matrix should be strictly 
positive (i.e.  0 1 > − jj a ), and all its principal minor must be positive.  
48 In addition to the foregoing assumptions, production technology, resource endowment and expenditure propensities 
of endogenous accounts remain constant. For further details on fixed-prices multipliers models, see Roland-Holst and 
Sancho [1995], Erik Thorbecke [1990], Defourny and Thorbecke [1984], and Decaluwé et al. [1999].    23
elements of the financial SAM. The results of this multipliers matrix are derived by inverting 
the sub-matrix of endogenous accounts from the intersecting original financial SAM matrix. 
These results are provided in Annex IV-A. On the production side, each entry or cell value 
) , ( j i r  in the multipliers matrix can be interpreted as an additional output generated in the row 
sector due to one US dollar increase in final demand for production. It measures the total 
stimulus to the i
th sector gross output when the j
th sector final demand changes by unity. 
When summed across the rows, ∑
i
j i r ) , ( measures the total (direct and indirect) impact of 
gross output when final demand for the j
th sector changes by unity, and all other final 
demands are set at zero. The term is also known as output multipliers.  
 
We focus on offer of composite goods accounts (column 29-33). Looking down the column 
(non traded rural production in column 29 – public sector production in column 33 and 
corresponding rows 29-33), the multiplier matrix indicates that an injection of one unit of 
resource in the non traded rural production generates about 1.9 units in additional production 
for this sector, ceteris paribus.
49 The multipliers effects of such an injection are lower for 
other sectors; and especially for the rural traded and public sector production, which have 
multipliers of about 0.1 and 0.07, respectively. The relatively low multipliers values illustrate 
the weak linkage between these sectors and the rural economy, particularly the non traded 
and traded rural production. However, the linkages between non traded rural production and 
informal sector production, and urban corporate production are stronger, as reflected by the 
size of the multipliers which are larger than unity. This implies that an injection of one unit of 
additional resources in the rural non traded production would generate about 1.7 units of 
additional production in the urban informal production, and 1.8 additional units to the 
corporate production, respectively.   
 
From the previous sections, remember that the non tradable informal sector production is 
entirely devoted to domestic consumption, largely relying on domestically produced inputs. 
Hence the relatively strong linkage between rural non traded and informal production sectors. 
By contrast, the extremely low linkages to the rural traded production reflects the  rural 
traded and non traded dichotomy characteristic of most developing countries and captured by 
the IMMPA framework (Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack [2003]). Similarly, the agricultural 
linkages to public sector production are also extremely low (less than 0.1). This probably 
reflects the nature of public sector output and production, which is essentially service 
oriented with large concentration in urban areas, but also the consumption stream. Most 
public sector goods are consumed by the government, here set as exogenous accounts.      
 
The relatively low linkages with the public production sector are not specific to the rural non 
traded production, however. The multipliers linkages with public sector production are 
consistently low across all other sectors; and the lowest score refers to the interaction with 
the rural traded production, which has a multiplier less than 0.1. The marginal propensities to 
consume government goods are very small in the endogenous accounts. The consistently low 
linkages probably reflect the relative weight of public sector production which accounts for 
less than 10 percent of overall value added. Low multipliers effects to public sectors are not 
                                                 
49 Although static in its approach, multipliers analysis provides some insights on expected growth and welfare effects of 
for instance increased public consumption from a cross-sectoral comparisons standpoint. A knowledge of policy impact 
ex-ante could be particularly useful and provide valuable input to the design of growth and poverty reduction strategies. 
For further details, see Bulmer-Thomas [1982].     24
uncommon, however. In a study based on one region of Ireland, Fannin [2000] found that a 
pound increase in final demand for production activities results only in 0.04 increase in 
government revenue. Nonetheless, the multipliers matrix is not symmetrical along the 
diagonal line; and the relatively low leakage to public sector production does not necessarily 
imply that an injection of additional resources to the public sector will have limited spillover 
effects and leakages to other sectors. In fact, looking at the intersection between column 33 
and rows 29-33, the multipliers matrix indicates that an injection of one unit of resources in 
the public sector production will generate 1.4 and 1.7 of additional production for the urban 
informal and corporate production, respectively. The relatively strong linkages between 
public sector production on one hand and informal and corporate production on the other 
hand further corroborates the geographical bias, where public sector production is highly 
concentrated in urban areas. The effects of increased resources to the public sectors on other 
sectors are significantly lower. In particular, these effects on the traded rural sectors are 
almost insignificant, with a multipliers smaller than 0.1.  
 
Although non traded rural production has the largest linkages to total production factors 
multipliers (3.3) and total production multipliers (4.9), the linkages between other sectors of 
production and the latter are generally high, irrespective of the geographical location and the 
formal-informal nature of employment.
50 The lowest total factor multiplier is 1.75, and 
corresponds to the additional increase in total factors that would follow an injection of one 
unit of resources into the urban private production. The much larger linkages of rural non 
traded sector are not specific to Cameroon; it is common in most Sub-Saharan African 
countries where agriculture is the mainstay of rural economy. For instance, agriculture was 
found to exhibit significantly larger linkages to domestic production, total supply, value 
added, and household income in Mozambique (Arndt et al. [2000]). However, despite the 
relatively large linkage to total factors, the ratio of capital to total factors multipliers is 
generally low. As expected, the lowest ratio is recorded in the non traded rural production 
sector (1.636/3.2812= 0.498). This probably reflects the low level of capital and the labor 
intensive nature of non tradable agricultural production, which is characteristic of low-
income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Arndt et al. [2000]). Public sector production is also 
highly labor intensive, as reflected in the low ratio of capital to total factor multipliers, which 
is of the same order of magnitude. By contrast, the traded rural production (0.634) and urban 
private (0.6297) have slightly higher ratio, an indication of higher capital-intensity.     
 
The non traded rural production own-sector multiplier is relatively large, compared to that of 
other sectors, and given the strong linkages with the informal sector production, which 
accounts for a sizable share of aggregate value added and active labor force, one would imply 
that the welfare effects of rural development-led growth are likely to be widespread and 
positive in Cameroon. Yet this may be only one aspect of the problem. Also important is the 
productivity of factors across sectors. Indeed, in this dimension, the non traded rural 
production has the lowest ratio of total sectoral production multipliers to total factors 
multipliers of 1.49 (4.90/3.286=1.49). The relatively low factor productivity raises the issue 
of efficiency in the use of production factors. The relatively low productivity of the non 
traded agricultural sector is not new. In a study carried out in the late 1990s, Blanford and 
                                                 
50 Total factor multipliers are defined as the sum across individual factors multipliers, mainly rural unskilled labor, 
urban unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital. The total production multipliers and demand for composite goods 
multipliers, as well as multipliers associated with other accounts are likewise defined.      25
Lynch [1990] found that the poorest 40% of farms account for only 3% of total agriculture 
sales, with many rural poor appearing as net food purchasers in Cameroon.  
 
The public sector has a relatively high ratio of total sectoral production over total factor 
multipliers in the magnitude of about 1.6. Higher total factor productivities are recorded in 
other sectors, and particularly rural traded agricultural sectors (1.74) and urban private 
production (1.75). The productivity gap across sectors reflects the variance in total factor 
multipliers and total sectoral production multipliers. Indeed total factor multipliers vary 
between 3.3 (the highest associated with non traded agricultural sector of production) and 
1.75 (the lowest associated with urban private production) when measured on the stream of 
composite goods. The large variance across sectors implies that a unit increase in the demand 
for composite goods will have a different employment effect across various sectors. 
Similarly, on the sectoral production multipliers scale, the total production multipliers vary 
between 4.9 and about 3.1; and the ranking across sectors is not consistent on both scales.         
 
The non traded rural production also has the largest multipliers on current expenditures of 
economic and institutional agents. The total multipliers associated with the current 
expenditure of economic agents is about 3.3 for the non traded rural production, suggesting 
that an injection of one unit of resources in the latter will increase current expenditures of 
about 3.3. However, the relatively large size of these multipliers is largely due to non 
capitalist households, especially given the extremely low multipliers of “capitalist 
households” on their current accounts (0.27). More generally, the linkages between the other 
four sectors of production and the current account of capitalist households are low in 
Cameroon. Conversely, the relatively high multipliers with other accounts suggest low 
leakages, hence, small profits, small imports and savings in the recipient households.         
 
The urban informal sector and corporate production have the largest own-sector multipliers, 
about 2.5 for the urban informal production and 2.3 for the corporate production, representing 
about 50% of total sectoral multipliers. The non traded rural production has an own-sector 
multiplier of about 1.9; and the other two sectors, traded rural production and public sector 
production have much lower values, about 1. Surprisingly, the last two sectors which exhibit 
the lowest own-sector multipliers have higher linkages to other sectors, reflecting the fact that 
most demand lies in exogenous accounts. This is especially the case for the rural traded 
production sector; although, it has own-sector multipliers of 1.1, its linkages with informal 
sector production and corporate production are 1.6 and 1.3, respectively. 
 
Looking at the financial side of the multipliers matrix (intersection of columns 29-33 and 
rows 37-51), the estimated multiplier values are relatively low for most accounts, except one: 
non financial companies. For instance, conditioned upon non agricultural traded sectors, the 
multipliers value ranges from 0.001 for the deposits in the changes in household assets and 
liabilities to 0.173 for the non financial companies. This implies that an injection of one unit 
of extra resources in the rural non traded production in the offer of composite goods accounts 
would generate about 0.17 units of additional production in the non financial sector accounts, 
and even less significant, about 0.001 additional units in the households deposits, a 
component of the changes in assets and liabilities accounts. In fact the multipliers effects 
associated with the changes in assets and liabilities accounts are generally very low, 
reflecting the level of savings by economic agents. Indeed the only exception concerns non 
financial companies which consistently has the largest multipliers. Non financial companies 
also enjoy the largest financial assets accumulation and saving rates, further supporting the   26
fact that income feedback flows affect financial accounts through the savings of economic 
agents. Indeed, over 40% of total financial assets accumulation accrues to non financial 
companies, which also have marginal propensity to save exceeding 40%.       
 
We also estimate the forward and backward linkages indices for the different production 
sectors from the multipliers matrix, following a normalization of the Leontief inverse using 
Rasmussen (1957). In the multipliers analysis, the linkages between sectors of production are 
the underlying hypothesis. Each new investment or injection of resources in one given sector 
or industry offers opportunities for other suppliers (backward linkages) and provides inputs 
for utilization by other users (forward linkages).
51 Naturally, forward and backward linkages 
have implications for growth and welfare. For instance, it has been argued that sustained 
growth and increased industrial production could be achieved more rapidly by concentrating 
resources on sectors with high forward and backward linkages (Bulmer-Thomas [1982]).
52  
 
Not surprising, of all the sectors, rural production (traded and non traded) yields above-
average backward linkages, with backward linkage index slightly above unity. The indices 
associated with these sectors are above the estimates derived for the urban private production, 
which is less than 0.8. A high backward linkage in rural production sectors implies that 
increased agricultural and rural production results into rising demands for agricultural inputs 
in the form of goods and factors. Hence, the multipliers and growth effects for the rural 
economy, and Cameroonian economy as a whole, are likely to be important. However, these 
effects will most likely depend on the nature and sources of agricultural inputs. 
 
At the same time, the production sectors, and especially rural traded sector, have low forward 
linkages. The low forward linkage index for this sector (0.35) reflects the fact that most of the 
production is exported. In contrast, urban corporate production and informal sector 
production have higher forward linkages of 1.6 and 1.9, respectively, reflecting the fact that 
their output is probably used as inputs and final goods for absorption by many other sectors 
of the economy. Hence, by expanding the capacity in these sectors, inducements are provided 
to using industries which now have an incentive to expand output and take advantage of the 
increased availability of inputs and to households by expanding income. However, informal 
sector activities are already widespread in Cameroon, where they account for over 50% of 
GDP. The widespread nature of informal sector activities already had implications for 
domestic resource mobilization across Sub-Saharan African countries, where it is believed to 
be partly responsible of the decreased tax effort in the early 1980s (Ndulu [1991]). Its 
expansion is likely to contribute to further deterioration of the government fiscal stance.            
 
We also use the derived multipliers matrix and results to simulate two policy experiments. 
These experiments assess the growth and income effects of increased public investment and 
capital expenditures, following hypothetical reduction in the stock of foreign debt and 
external debt servicing, highly likely within the framework of the HIPC relief to which 
Cameroon qualifies. Under the present scenario, the savings from reduced interest payments 
associated with a hypothetical HIPC relief are entirely reallocated to finance public 
                                                 
51 Note that the backward and forward linkages are not reflected in market prices and therefore represent an externality, 
which could cause the social benefits of an investment to diverge from the private benefits.  
52 The backward linkages is estimated by taking the ratio of the average stimulus imparted to other sectors by a unit’s 
worth of demand for sectors j over the average stimulus  for the whole economy when all final demands are increased 
by unity. For further details, see Bulmer-Thomas [1982].     27
investment, particularly rehabilitation of public infrastructure to improve service delivery. 
The relief is invested uniformly across all sectors in accordance with the government public 
investment program (PIP).
53 The results of the simulations are provided in Table 3 below. 
 
 
Table 3: Simulation of Growth and Welfare Effects of Increased Public Spending under 











Production factors’ remuneration     
Total remuneration of Unskilled Rural Labor  1 347.064    1 457.185    8.17% 
Total remuneration of Unskilled Urban Labor  1 368.916    1 473.042    7.61% 
Total remuneration of Skilled Labor  856.823    918.301    7.18% 
Total remuneration of Capital  5 229.584    5 698.564    8.97% 
Incomes of Economic Agents     
Rural Households of non tradable agricultural sector  1 600.108    1 733.811    8.36% 
Rural Households of tradable agricultural sector  143.592    155.195    8.08% 
Urban Unskilled Households working in informal sector  3 218.932    3 499.637    8.72% 
Urban Unskilled Households working in formal sectors  891.048    956.145    7.31% 
Urban Skilled Households  959.584    1 026.191    6.94% 
Capitalistic Households  902.373    978.227    8.41% 
Non Financial Companies  1 339.606    1 458.574    8.88% 
Commercial Banks  161.124    171.938    6.71% 
Sectoral Production     
Non Traded Rural Production  1 875.396    2 034.520    8.48% 
Traded Rural Production  770.624    808.382    4.90% 
Urban Informal Production  5 034.755    5 466.564    8.58% 
Urban Corporate Production  6 218.665    6 879.297    10.62% 
Public Sector Production  1 082.518    1 098.633    1.49% 
Change in Financial Assets of Economic Agents     
Rural Households of non tradable agricultural sector   17.259     18.699    8.34% 
Rural Households of tradable agricultural sector  7.845     8.458    7.81% 
Urban Unskilled Households working in informal sector  203.179    220.610    8.58% 
Urban Unskilled Households working in formal sectors  118.811    127.291    7.14% 
Urban Skilled Households  157.912    168.669    6.81% 
Capitalistic Households   246.271    266.693    8.29% 
Non Financial Companies  720.538    770.351    6.91% 
Commercial Banks  164.873    171.022    3.73% 
GDP  8 802.386    9 547.092    8.46%
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
   
Given the detailed structure of the financial SAM and the wealth of information provided by 
the Cameroon data, the simulated policy experiments allow us to assess the growth and 
income effects of increased public investment at the aggregate levels, but also at micro levels. 
In particular, the simulated effects of increased public investment are assessed on the overall 
economic growth rates, and across economic and institutional agents, looking specifically at 
                                                 
53 Naturally, within the framework of the PRSP process, the public investment program, which underpins the growth 
and poverty reduction strategies will have to be in aligned with the government priorities, which may emphasize both 
investment expenditures for sustainable growth in the medium and long-term, and recurrent spending to ensure 
improved and continued delivery of social services, especially to the poor and vulnerable groups.   28
inherent changes on the remuneration of production factors, changes in urban and rural 
household income, changes in the level of production across the traditional IMMPA income 
groups, and changes in financial assets of economic agents and financial institutions. The 
results show a robust increase in the level of GDP. The simulated growth rate is about 8.5%, 
significantly above the growth rate of 5% recorded during the same period (Cameroon DSNA 
[2000], World Bank [2000]). The positive effects of simulations reflects the fact that 
increased investment results in rising demand for goods, and hence production. 
 
Except in few cases, and particularly on the production side, the growth process is uniform. 
Its benefits are evenly distributed across sectors and economic agents. A comparison between 
the base case and the simulated results shows that the total remuneration of rural unskilled 
labor increases by over 8%, slightly above the remuneration of urban unskilled and skilled 
labor. Similarly, the remuneration of capital is higher under the simulated scenario, with a 
growth rate of about 9%. The more rapid increase of total remuneration of capital under the 
current scenario is reflected in the structure of production. The urban corporate production, 
which is one of the most capital intensive sectors increases by over 10.6%, higher than the 
aggregate economic growth rates. The non traded agricultural production also increases 
significantly as well, with a hypothesized growth rate of 8.5%, above that of the traded 
sector, which is less than 5%. By contrast, public sector production, which exhibits the lowest 
own-sector multipliers, forward and backward linkage indices, increases by only 1.5%, an 
illustration of the highly variable growth rates across the different sectors in urban areas.       
  
The robust growth rate for the capitalist and corporate production in urban areas is also 
reflected in the distribution of income growth at the household levels. Capitalist households 
and non financial companies show the strongest growth in income under the simulated policy 
experiment. The income accruing to these two groups increases by about 8.5 and 9 %, 
respectively, above the income earned by rural households deriving their income from traded 
and non traded agricultural production. However, the income growth of capitalist and non 
financial companies falls within the range of urban unskilled households working in the 
informal sector. This is also reflected in the changes in financial assets. Capitalist households 
and households engaged in informal sectors activities have the largest increase in financial 
assets. The increase is general across all the other income groups, although of a much lower 
magnitude. For instance, the changes in commercial banks’ financial assets are relatively 
low, reflecting the initially low level and particularly the degree of monetization of the 
economy.        
 
 
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper describes a financial social accounting matrix for the Cameroonian economy 
based on the most recent data sets. In particular, it presents a detailed structure of the 
economy of the post-devaluation growth period. The aftermath of the 1994 CFA Franc 
devaluation was characterized by the implementation of a number of structural reforms, most 
notably changes in the composition of public expenditures illustrated by cuts in wages and 
salaries and hiring a freeze in the public sector. These reforms were accompanied by the 
implementation of stabilization policies with implications for labor markets and employment, 
growth and investment, household income, consumption and poverty. The analysis of the 
financial SAM shows that the post-devaluation growth period is also characterized by robust   29
informal sector production, which accounts for a sizable share of total production at factor 
costs and gross value added.  
 
Though rural-to-urban migration remains important and may have contributed to increased 
supply of urban labor, the rapidly rising scope of informal sector activities, one of the key 
characteristics of the Cameroonian economy, and the nature of the growth process in the 
post-devaluation period may also have played a critical role in the structure of the economy 
of the late 1990s. That period is characterized by continued low investment and rapid 
depreciation of capital stock, particularly in rural areas, and rising unemployment. Under 
these conditions, the informal sector need not be viewed as an engine for long-term growth; 
instead, it should be viewed as a disguised form of unemployment and short-term alternative 
to a shortage of formal employment, especially given the skill mix of its labor force and its 
implication for domestic resource mobilization in the short run, and investment in the 
medium to long-term.    
 
The detailed structure of the financial SAM also allows a further analysis of the structural 
characteristics of the Cameroonian economy, and particularly intra and inter-sectoral linkages 
and flows of funds and resources across sectors. While own-sector multipliers appear to be 
generally high across all the IMMPA-based production sectors, implying that increased 
investment or additional resources in a given sector are likely to have a greater impact within 
the sector, inter-sectoral multipliers are highly variable. For instance, while the effects of an 
injection of additional resources in the public sector are insignificant on the rural traded 
sector, they tend to be relatively high on informal and urban corporate production. A similar 
contrast is observed on the other key production sectors, where the relatively strong linkages 
between informal sector production and rural production (traded and non traded) is worth 
pointing out. However, factor productivity appears to be very low in rural areas, 
notwithstanding the relatively high total multiplier linkages. Moreover, in terms of future 
prospects for growth and industrial production, rural sectors have low forward linkages, 
while urban corporate production enjoys one of the highest forward linkage indexes.    
 
The simulations highlight the income and growth effects of increased public investment, 
following hypothetical debt relief and reduction of external debt servicing within the 
framework of the HIPC initiative, and under fixed-price multipliers. Increased public 
investment results in a higher level of GDP and household income, almost across all sectors 
and income groups. However, the financial SAM-based multipliers are based on a number of 
restrictive assumptions. The most noticeable ones include the hypothesis of excess capacity, 
which is essential for prices to remain constant. A relaxation of the fixed-prices assumption is 
likely to impact on the distribution of income and growth across sectors and geographical 
regions.  
 
The simulations consider an extreme case where the hypothetical relief from the HIPC is 
entirely reallocated to finance public investment and capital expenditures. In practice and in 
support of the PRSP process, a mix of recurrent and capital expenditures is a likely feature of 
growth and poverty reduction strategies. The proposed financial SAM provides the data 
framework for constructing the IMMPA model for Cameroon. The IMMPA model has a 
financial CGE-type architecture, with a dynamic and a more flexible structure, and should 
provide the basis for assessing the growth and income distribution and welfare effects of 
macroeconomic reforms and increased public spending under differing composition of 
investment and recurrent expenses. Moving beyond the functional distribution of income, and   30
drawing on the financial SAM, the IMMPA model could also provide the framework for 
investigating effects of alternative macroeconomic policies on income and poverty at the 
household and individual levels, exploiting the linkages between national accounts and 
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Annex I: Cameroon Key Economic and Social Indicators (1981 – 2001) 
                                                                 
  1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
                                                                 
                       
Real Setor                       
Real GDP growth (%)  17.1 7.6 6.8 7.5 8.1 6.8 -2.2 -7.9 -1.8 -6.2 -3.8 -3.1 -3.2 -2.5 3.3 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.4 4.2 5.3
Real  GDP per capita growth  (%)   13.7 4.6 4.0 4.7 5.3 3.9 -4.9 -10.5 -4.7 -9.0 -6.6 -5.9 -6.0 -5.3 0.5 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.3 2.4
RGDP per capita in 1990US$  1,051 1,100 1,144 1,197 1,260 1,310 1,246 1,115 1,063 968 903 850 799 757 760 777 794 811 824 835 855
CPI (% change), (%)   7.5 15.3 20.5 12.1 4.2 4.3 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 -0.6 1.9 -3.7 12.7 25.8 6.6 5.1 0.0 2.9 0.8 2.8
Total investment in % of GDP  27.2 24.8 26.0 25.9 24.9 25.5 24.7 20.9 17.1 17.8 16.7 13.5 16.6 15.3 14.5 15.4 16.2 17.5 18.7 16.4 17.8
Gross public invest. as share of GDP (%)  4.5 4.2 4.9 6.6 7.7 10.4 11.4 9.2 6.1 5.5 4.0 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.2 0.5 1.0 2.0 2.3 1.4 2.1
Population growth   (%)   2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
                       
Fiscal (in percentage of GDP)                       
Overall surplus/deficit, excl. all grants    -0.2 0.2 4.1 -0.3 -1.6 -1.2 -13.0 -5.9 -4.5 -7.6 -7.0 -7.9 -6.3 -9.1 -3.2 -1.5 -1.4 -1.7 -3.4 1.4 2.0
Overall surplus/deficit, incl. all grants (%)  -0.2 0.2 4.1 -0.3 -1.6 -1.2 -13.0 -5.9 -4.5 -7.6 -7.0 -6.6 -6.3 -9.1 -3.1 -1.3 -1.0 -1.4 -3.2 1.4 2.4
Govern. revenue, incl. all grants   20.9 24.7 26.5 22.6 21.0 21.4 18.4 16.4 16.0 14.3 16.4 15.7 13.7 10.2 13.1 14.8 15.1 16.5 15.7 18.8 21.0
Govern. revenues, excl. all grants (%)   20.9 24.7 26.5 22.6 21.0 21.4 18.4 16.4 16.0 14.3 16.4 14.4 13.6 10.2 13.0 14.6 14.7 16.2 15.5 18.8 20.6
Gov. Expenditure  21.1 24.5 22.4 23.0 22.6 22.6 31.3 22.3 20.6 21.8 23.4 22.3 20.0 19.3 16.2 16.1 16.1 17.9 18.9 17.4 18.6
                       
External  (in % of GDP)                       
External current account  -6.8 5.0 2.3 4.3 4.2 -3.3 -6.3 -5.1 -2.1 -4.4 -2.2 -2.5 -5.4 -4.4 -0.9 -4.1 -2.8 -2.5 -4.3 -1.7 -2.2
External current account excluding grants  -7.2 4.6 1.9 3.9 3.8 -3.7 -6.5 -5.3 -2.6 -4.6 -2.9 -4.1 -5.9 -4.9 -1.9 -4.4 -2.8 -2.8 -4.3 -1.7 -2.2
Exports of goods and services  25.3 36.0 32.7 33.0 33.4 23.3 16.7 16.0 20.7 20.4 20.8 20.5 17.1 22.1 25.7 22.5 25.3 26.5 24.4 30.7 31.8
Imports of goods and services  29.0 27.7 26.5 24.1 21.9 20.7 18.2 16.0 18.0 20.1 17.0 18.3 16.0 19.5 20.7 20.5 22.4 24.8 24.7 26.8 29.2
External public debt  15.8 16.7 16.3 15.4 26.4 26.5 27.8 26.5 30.7 38.0 49.0 54.2 63.6 107.2 85.3 77.6 73.8 77.0 76.7 69.6 67.1
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Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 1/6 
Production factors  Current Accounts of Economic Agents  Production Sectors 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  1  2  3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15 16 17  18  19 20 
Unskilled Rural Labor  1                                               617 776 58 450         
Unskilled Urban Labor  2                                                     287 124 237 446 162 626
Skilled Labor  3                                                        267 759 162 366
Production 
factors 
Capital 4                                               185 275 121 188 1 324 866 934 300 59 622
Rural Non Traders Households  5  617 776       185 275                      27    176                  
Rural Traders Households  6  58 450       11 460                      289    1 884                  
Urban Unskilled Informal Households  7     287 124    1 324 866                      3 914                        
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8     400 072                         22 863 3 238    21 133                  
Urban Skilled Households  9        425 025                      30 483 3 482    22 721                  
Capitalistic Households  10           321 202                   99 071 7 094    25 624                  
Non Financial Companies  11           662 083                      5 180 34 5 185                  
Commercial Banks  12           11 491 21 229 3 110 2 573 2 766 3 119  39 014    2 093 16 468                  
Central Bank  13                                   1 900    15 327                  





































Rest Of the World  15        5 100    27 287 3 885 3 215 3 456 3 897          209 736                  
Non Traded Rural Production  16                                                             
Traded Rural Production  17                                                             
Urban Informal Production  18                                                             









Public Sector Production  20                                                             
Non Traded Rural Production  21                                                             
Traded Rural Production  22                                                             
Urban Informal Production  23                                                             




































Public Sector Production  25                                                             
Non Traded Rural Production  26                                                             









Urban Corporate Production  28                                                             
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Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 2/6 
Production factors  Current Accounts of Economic Agents  Production Sectors 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  1 2 3  4  5  6 7  8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 18  19 20 
Non Traded Rural Production  29              234 062 19 351 409 503 97 708 73 201 55 257                64 523    204 459 25 482 656
Traded Rural Production  30              4 246 351 7 427 1 773 1 328 1 002                   2 930 97 577 116 306 131
Urban Informal Production  31              333 631 27 583 439 103 104 771 81 981 61 151                31 705 88 023 265 188 659 526 68 680




























Public Sector Production  33              12 770 1 055 37 462 8 938 12 408 10 240          446 097    949 371 3 443 8 463 193
Non Traded Rural Production  34                                            3 192               









Urban Corporate Production  36                                            869 001               
Rural Non Traders Households  37              8 653                                             
Rural Traders Households  38                 3 815                                          
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  39                    100 334                                       
Urban Unsk. Formal Households  40                       58 268                                    
Urban Skilled Households  41                          77 793                                 
Capitalistic Households  42                             121 961                              
Non Financial Companies  43                                281 576                           
Commercial Banks  44                                   49 043                        
Central Bank  45                                                             





































Rest Of the World  47                                            -156 299               
Fiduciary Currencies  48                                                             
Deposits 49                                                             
Special Deposits to Central Bank  50                                                             
Bank Reserves  51                                                             
Capital Shares  52                                                             
Credits 53                                                             
Bills issued by Government  54                                                             
Advances to  Treasury  55                                                             
State Consolidated Credits  56                                                             
Refinancing 57                                                             



































External Financial Resources  59                                                             
Summation  676 226  687 196 430 125 2 625 251 803 254 72 083 1 615 904 447 306 481 711 452 991  672 482 80 884 17 227 836 907 993 631 941 449 386 853 2 527 447 3 121 770 543 424  37
Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 3/6 
Production for Domestic Market  Imports  Offer of Composite Goods  Exports  Capital Accounts of 
Economic Agents 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  21 22  23  24  25  26  27  28 29 30  31  32  33  34  35 36  37  38  39  40 
Unskilled Rural Labor  1                                                             
Unskilled Urban Labor  2                                                             
Skilled Labor  3                                                             
Factors 
Capital 4                                                             
Rural Non Traders Households  5                                                             
Rural Traders Households  6                                                             
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  7                                                             
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8                                                             
Urban Skilled Households  9                                                             
Capitalistic Households  10                                                             
Non Financial Companies  11                                                             
Commercial Banks  12                                                             
Central Bank  13                                                             





































Rest Of the World  15                 22 012 1 377 740 639                                    
Non Traded Rural Production  16  938 257                                     3 192                  
Traded Rural Production  17     187 692                                     199 161               
Urban Informal Production  18        2 527 447                                                   




















Public Sector Production  20              543 424                                             
Non Traded Rural Production  21                          938 833                                 
Traded Rural Production  22                             190 876                              
Urban Informal Production  23                                2 544 460                           




































Public Sector Production  25                                      543 424                     
Non Traded Rural Production  26                          22 235                                 









Urban Corporate Production  28                                   815 392                        
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Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 4/6 
Production for Domestic Market  Imports  Offer of Composite Goods  Exports  Capital Accounts of Economic 
Agents 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  21 22  23  24  25  26  27  28 29 30  31  32  33  34  35 36 37 38  39  40 
Non Traded Rural Production  29                                                  8 674    -138 159   
Traded Rural Production  30                                                     4 048      
Urban Informal Production  31                                                        241 645   




























Public Sector Production  33                                                             
Non Traded Rural Production  34                                                             









Urban Corporate Production  36                                                             
Rural Non Traders Households  37                                                             
Rural Traders Households  38                                                             
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  39                                                             
Urban Unsk. Formal Households  40                                                             
Urban Skilled Households  41                                                             
Capitalistic Households  42                                                             
Non Financial Companies  43                                                             
Commercial Banks  44                                                             
Central Bank  45                                                             





































Rest Of the World  47                                                             
Fiduciary Currencies  48                                                  -28 -306 -4 136 -3 422
Deposits 49                                                  18 196 2 646 2 189
Special Deposits to Central Bank  50                                                             
Bank Reserves  51                                                             
Capital Shares  52                                                           60 876
Credits 53                                                             
Bills issued by Government  54                                                             
Advances to the Treasury  55                                                             
State Consolidated Credits  56                                                             
Refinancing 57                                                             



































External Financial Resources  59                                                             
Summation  938 833 190 876 2 544 460 2 487 478 543 424 22 235 1 564 815 392 961 068 192 440 2 544 460 3 302 870 543 424 3 192 224 156 869 001 8 664 3 938 101 996 59 643  39
Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 5/6 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































Unskilled Rural Labor  1                                                           676 226
Unskilled Urban Labor  2                                                           687 196
Skilled Labor  3                                                           430 125
Production factors 
Capital  4                                                           2 625 251
Rural Non Traders Households  5                                                           803 254
Rural Traders Households  6                                                           72 083
Urban Unskilled Informal Households  7                                                           1 615 904
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8                                                           447 306
Urban Skilled Households  9                                                           481 711
Capitalistic Households  10                                                          452 991
Non Financial Companies  11                                                          672 482
Commercial Banks  12                                                          80 884
Central Bank  13                                                          17 227





































Rest Of the World  15                                                          993 631
Non Traded Rural Production  16                                                          941 449
Traded Rural Production  17                                                          386 853
Urban Informal Production  18                                                          2 527 447




















Public Sector Production  20                                                          543 424
Non Traded Rural Production  21                                                          938 833
Traded Rural Production  22                                                          190 876
Urban Informal Production  23                                                          2 544 460




































Public Sector Production  25                                                          543 424
Non Traded Rural Production  26                                                          22 235
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Annex II: Cameroon’s 1995/96 Financial Social Accounting Matrix for IMMPA (10
6 CFA Francs. 1 Euro= 655.957 CFA Francs) - Folio 6/6 
Capital Accounts of Economic Agents  Changes in Assets and Liabilities 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Non Traded Rural Production  29        -93 649                                                 961 068
Traded Rural Production  30        -44 679                                                 192 440
Urban Informal Production  31        141 473                                                 2 544 460




























Public Sector Production  33                 1 035                                        543 424
Non Traded Rural Production  34                                                           3 192









Urban Corporate Production  36                                                           869 001
Rural Non Traders Households  37                                      11                   8 664
Rural Traders Households  38                                      123                   3 938
Urban Unskilled Informal Households  39                                      1 662                   101 996
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  40                                      1 375                   59 643
Urban Skilled Households  41                                      1 479                   79 272
Capitalistic Households  42                                      1 667                   123 628
Non Financial Companies  43                                   65 245 14 889                   361 710
Commercial Banks  44                          9 706                      -13 601 37 618    82 766
Central Bank  45                       -15 720    16 167  32 774                   -32 694    527





































Rest Of the World  47                                                        2 016 -154 283
Fiduciary Currencies  48  -3 679 -4 149                                                    -15 720
Deposits 49  2 354 2 654 -14 251       13 900                                        9 706
Special Deposits to Central Bank  50        1 942       14 225                                        16 167
Bank Reserves  51           32 774                                              32 774
Capital Shares  52  80 597 125 123    44 273    -245 624                                        65 245
Credits 53           37 677                                              37 677
Bills issued by Government  54           -15 846                                              -15 846
Advances to the Treasury  55              -4 000                                           -4 000
State Consolidated Credits  56                                                             
Refinancings 57              -13 601                                           -13 601



































External Financial Resources  59           -16 112 18 128                                           2 016
Summation  79 272 123 628 361 710 82 766 527 86 686 -154 283 -15 720 9 706 16 167  32 774 65 245 37 677 -15 846 -4 000    -13 601 22 429 2 016   
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ANNEX III: Structure of economic agents’ change in financial liabilities (resources) 





































































































































































































































































































































































 Own  resources  (savings)  17.237    7.600    199.869    116.072    154.966    242.950    560.908    97.695       144.534    -311.353  1 230.478 
+ Fiduciary Currencies                           -31.316        -31.316 
+ Deposits to commercial banks                        19.335             19.335 
+ Special deposits to Central Bank                           32.206          32.206 
+ Bank reserves                           65.287          65.287 
+ Capital shares                      129.970                129.970 
+ Credits   0.022    0.245    3.311    2.739    2.946    3.321     29.659          32.811       75.054 
+ Public bonds                              -31.566     -31.566 
+ Advances to the Treasury                              -7.968     -7.968 
+ Refinancing                        -27.094           -27.094 
+ External Commitments                        74.936    -65.127  34.871       44.680 
+ External financial resources                                  4.016    4.016 
= Total change in capital resources  17.259  7.845 203.180 118.811 157.912 246.271  720.537 164.872  1.050 172.682 -307.337 1  503.082 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   42
ANNEX IV: Structure of economic agents’ change in financial assets (uses) 






































































































































































































































































































































































  Accumulation of capital goods   17.279    8.064    206.147               745.058          253.930       1 230.478   
+ Fiduciary Currencies  -0.056  -0.610  -8.239  -6.817  -7.329  -8.265                 -31.316 
+ Deposits to commercial banks   0.036    0.391    5.272    4.361    4.689    5.287    -28.390        27.689       19.335   
+ Special deposits to Central Bank                      3.869          28.337       32.206   
+ Bank reserves                        65.287             65.287   
+ Capital shares           121.267    160.552    249.249       88.193       -489.291     129.970   
+ Credits                        75.054             75.054   
+ Public bonds                        -31.566           -31.566 
+ Advances to the Treasury                           -7.968        -7.968 
+ Refinancing                           -27.094        -27.094 
+ External Commitments                              352.017    -307.337  44.680   
+ External financial resources                        -32.096  36.112          4.016   
= Total change in assets   17.259    7.845    203.180    118.811    157.912    246.271     720.537    164.872    1.050    172.682    -307.337  1 503.082   
Source: Authors’ calculations.   43
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA(*) - Folio 1/6 
Production factors  Current Accounts of Economic Agents  Production Sectors 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  16  17  18  19  20 
Unskilled Rural Labor  1  1.63 .48 .38 .37 .63 .60 .51 .47  .38  .32 .11 .10 1.25 .55 .45 .38 .40
Unskilled Urban Labor  2  .32 1.28 .23 .25 .33 .31 .32 .25  .23  .19 .17 .06 .31 .29 .39 .36 .57
Skilled  Labor  3  .13 .12 1.11 .11 .13 .13 .14 .11 .11 .10 .09 .03 .13 .13 .12 .21 .42
Production 
factors 
Capital 4  1.56 1.31 1.05 2.17 1.57 1.52 1.50 1.18  1.07  .89 .75 .30 1.68 1.67 1.83 1.61 1.36
Rural Non Traders Households  5  1.60 .53 .42 .49 1.69 .66 .57 .51  .43  .35 .15 .11 1.26 .62 .54 .46 .46
Rural Traders Households  6  .15 .05 .04 .04 .06 1.06 .05 .05  .04  .03 .01 .01 .12 .05 .05 .04 .04
Urban Unskilled Informal Households  7  .93 1.20 .63 1.20 .93 .90 1.89 .70  .64  .53 .45 .23 .98 .97 1.09 .96 .93
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8  .20 .76 .14 .17 .20 .20 .20 1.16  .15  .12 .14 .08 .20 .19 .24 .22 .34
Urban Skilled Households  9  .15 .14 1.11 .14 .15 .15 .15 .13  1.12  .11 .14 .08 .15 .15 .14 .23 .43
Capitalistic Households  10  .25 .21 .17 .35 .25 .25 .24 .19  .17  1.14 .27 .15 .27 .27 .30 .26 .22





































Commercial  Banks  12 .04 .03 .03 .05 .04 .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 .08 1.01 .04 .04 .04 .04 .03
Non Traded Rural Production  16  .93 .71 .56 .55 .94 .88 .75 .69  .57  .47 .17 .14 1.88 .58 .66 .54 .59
Traded Rural Production  17  .12 .10 .08 .08 .11 .16 .11 .09  .08  .07 .01 .02 .11 1.10 .13 .13 .09
Urban Informal Production  18  1.80 1.48 1.13 1.34 1.81 1.73 1.73 1.30  1.14  .95 .83 .33 1.69 1.56 2.46 1.48 1.40









Public Sector Production  20  .07 .07 .06 .06 .07 .07 .07 .06  .06  .05 .03 .02 .07 .05 .06 .06 1.06
Non Traded Rural Production  21  .93 .72 .56 .55 .94 .88 .75 .69  .57  .47 .17 .14 .89 .58 .66 .54 .59
Traded Rural Production  22  .12 .10 .08 .08 .12 .17 .11 .09  .08  .07 .01 .02 .11 .11 .13 .13 .09
Urban Informal Production  23  1.81 1.49 1.13 1.34 1.82 1.74 1.74 1.31  1.15  .95 .84 .33 1.70 1.57 1.47 1.49 1.41




































Public Sector Production  25  .07 .07 .06 .06 .07 .07 .07 .06  .06  .05 .03 .02 .07 .05 .06 .06 .06
(*) Accounts have the same numbering as in the financial SAM (see annex I).    44
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA - Folio 2/6 
Production factors  Current Accounts of Economic Agents  Production Sectors 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  16  17  18  19  20 
Non Traded Rural Production  26  .02 .02 .01 .01 .02 .02 .02 .02 .01  .01 .00 .00 .02 .01 .02 .01 .01









Urban Corporate Production  28  .47 .43 .39 .40 .47 .45 .48 .39 .39  .33 .32 .11 .45 .46 .43 .45 .43
Non Traded Rural Production  29  .96 .73 .57 .56 .96 .90 .76 .71 .58  .48 .17 .15 .91 .59 .67 .56 .60
Traded Rural Production  30  .12 .10 .08 .08 .12 .17 .11 .09 .08  .07 .01 .02 .11 .11 .13 .13 .09
Urban Informal Production  31  1.81 1.49 1.13 1.34 1.82 1.74 1.74 1.31 1.15  .95 .84 .33 1.70 1.57 1.47 1.49 1.41




























Public Sector Production  33  .07 .07 .06 .06 .07 .07 .07 .06 .06  .05 .03 .02 .07 .05 .06 .06 .06
Non Traded Rural Production  34  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00









Urban Corporate Production  36  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Non Traders Households  37  .02 .01 .00 .01 .02 .01 .01 .01 .00  .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00
Rural Traders Households  38  .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  39  .06 .07 .04 .07 .06 .06 .12 .04 .04  .03 .03 .01 .06 .06 .07 .06 .06
Urban Unsk. Formal Households  40  .03 .10 .02 .02 .03 .03 .03 .15 .02  .02 .02 .01 .03 .02 .03 .03 .04
Urban Skilled Households  41  .02 .02 .18 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .18  .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 .02 .04 .07
Capitalistic Households  42  .07 .06 .05 .09 .07 .07 .07 .05 .05  .31 .07 .04 .07 .07 .08 .07 .06





































Commercial Banks  44  .02 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02  .02 .03 .61 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Fiduciary Currencies  48  -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01  -.01 -.01 .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01



































Bank Reserves  51  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01  .01 .01 .24 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01  45
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA - Folio 3/6 
Production for Domestic Market  Imports  Offer of Composite Goods 




































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  21 22 23 24 25 26  27  28  29 30 31 32 33 
Unskilled Rural Labor  1  1.25 .54 .45 .35 .40 .00 .00 .00 1.22 .53 .45 .26 .40
Unskilled Urban Labor  2  .31 .29 .39 .33 .57 .00 .00 .00 .30 .28 .39 .25 .57
Skilled Labor  3  .13 .12 .12 .19 .42 .00 .00 .00 .13 .12 .12 .15 .42
Production 
factors 
Capital 4  1.68 1.64 1.81 1.47 1.36 .00 .00 .00 1.64 1.63 1.81 1.11 1.36
Rural Non Traders Households  5  1.26 .61 .54 .42 .46 .00 .00 .00 1.23 .60 .54 .32 .46
Rural Traders Households  6  .12 .05 .05 .04 .04 .00 .00 .00 .11 .05 .05 .03 .04
Urban Unskilled Informal 
Households  7 .98 .95 1.08 .88 .93 .00 .00 .00 .95 .94 1.08 .66 .93
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8  .20 .18 .24 .20 .34 .00 .00 .00 .19 .18 .24 .15 .34
Urban Skilled Households  9  .15 .14 .14 .21 .43 .00 .00 .00 .14 .14 .14 .16 .43
Capitalistic Households  10  .27 .27 .29 .24 .22 .00 .00 .00 .26 .26 .29 .18 .22





































Commercial Banks  12  .04 .04 .04 .03 .03 .00 .00 .00 .04 .04 .04 .03 .03
Non Traded Rural Production  16  1.88 .57 .65 .50 .59 .00 .00 .00 1.84 .56 .65 .38 .59
Traded Rural Production  17  .11 1.09 .13 .12 .09 .00 .00 .00 .11 1.08 .13 .09 .09
Urban Informal Production  18  1.68 1.53 2.44 1.35 1.40 .00 .00 .00 1.65 1.52 2.44 1.02 1.40









Public Sector Production  20  .07 .05 .06 .05 1.06 .00 .00 .00 .06 .05 .06 .04 1.06
Non Traded Rural Production  21  1.88 .57 .65 .50 .59 .00 .00 .00 1.84 .56 .65 .38 .59
Traded Rural Production  22  .11 1.10 .13 .12 .09 .00 .00 .00 .11 1.10 .13 .09 .09
Urban Informal Production  23  1.70 1.54 2.46 1.36 1.41 .00 .00 .00 1.66 1.53 2.46 1.03 1.41




































Public Sector Production  25  .07 .05 .06 .05 1.06 .00 .00 .00 .06 .05 .06 .04 1.06  46
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA - Folio 4/6 
Production for Domestic Market  Imports  Offer of Composite Goods 




































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28  29  30  31  32  33 
Non Traded Rural Production  26  .02 .01 .02 .01 .01 1.00 .00  .00 .04 .01 .02 .01 .01









Urban Corporate Production  28  .45 .45 .43 .41 .43 .00 .00  1.00 .44 .45 .43 .56 .43
Non Traded Rural Production  29  .91 .58 .67 .51 .60 .00 .00  .00 1.88 .58 .67 .38 .60
Traded Rural Production  30  .11 .11 .13 .12 .09 .00 .00  .00 .11 1.10 .13 .09 .09
Urban Informal Production  31  1.70 1.54 1.46 1.36 1.41 .00 .00  .00 1.66 1.53 2.46 1.03 1.41




























Public Sector Production  33  .07 .05 .06 .05 .06 .00 .00  .00 .06 .05 .06 .04 1.06
Non Traded Rural Production  34  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00









Urban Corporate Production  36  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Non Traders Households  37  .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00
Rural Traders Households  38  .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  39  .06 .06 .07 .05 .06 .00 .00  .00 .06 .06 .07 .04 .06
Urban Unsk. Formal Households  40  .03 .02 .03 .03 .04 .00 .00  .00 .02 .02 .03 .02 .04
Urban Skilled Households  41  .02 .02 .02 .03 .07 .00 .00  .00 .02 .02 .02 .03 .07
Capitalistic Households  42  .07 .07 .08 .06 .06 .00 .00  .00 .07 .07 .08 .05 .06





































Commercial Banks  44  .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .00 .00  .00 .02 .02 .02 .01 .02
Fiduciary Currencies  48  -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .00 .00  .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01



































Bank Reserves  51  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00  .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01  47
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA - Folio 5/6 
Exports  Capital Accounts of Economic Agents  Endogenous Changes in Assets 
and Liabilities 


















































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  34  35  36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 48  49  51 
Unskilled Rural Labor  1  1.25 .48 .37 1.22 .55 -.60 .00  .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .00 .00
Unskilled Urban Labor  2  .31 .26 .35 .30 .29 .51 .00  .00 .00 .29 .00 .00 .00 .00
Skilled Labor  3  .13 .11 .20 .13 .13 .11 .00  .00 .00 .15 .00 .00 .00 .00
Production 
factors 
Capital 4  1.68 1.48 1.56 1.64 1.67 2.08 .00  .00 .00 1.22 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Non Traders Households  5  1.26 .55 .44 1.23 .62 -.40 .00  .00 .00 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Traders Households  6  .12 .05 .04 .11 .05 -.04 .00  .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unskilled Informal Households  7  .98 .86 .93 .95 .97 1.26 .00  .00 .00 .74 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unskilled Formal Households  8  .20 .17 .22 .19 .19 .31 .00  .00 .00 .18 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Skilled Households  9  .15 .13 .22 .14 .15 .14 .00  .00 .00 .16 .00 .00 .00 .00
Capitalistic Households  10  .27 .24 .25 .26 .27 .34 .00  .00 .00 .20 .00 .00 .00 .00





































Commercial Banks  12  .04 .03 .04 .04 .04 .05 .00  .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00
Non Traded Rural Production  16  1.88 .51 .53 1.84 .58 -.94 .00  .00 .00 .10 .00 .00 .00 .00
Traded Rural Production  17  .11 .98 .13 .11 1.11 .15 .00  .00 .00 -.02 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Informal Production  18  1.69 1.39 1.43 1.65 1.56 3.55 .00  .00 .00 1.39 .00 .00 .00 .00









Public Sector Production  20  .07 .05 .05 .06 .05 .05 .00  .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00
Non Traded Rural Production  21  .89 .51 .53 1.84 .58 -.94 .00  .00 .00 .10 .00 .00 .00 .00
Traded Rural Production  22  .11 .09 .13 .11 1.13 .16 .00  .00 .00 -.02 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Informal Production  23  1.70 1.40 1.44 1.66 1.57 3.58 .00  .00 .00 1.40 .00 .00 .00 .00




































Public Sector Production  25  .07 .05 .05 .06 .05 .05 .00  .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00  48
Annex V-A: Endogenous Accounts and Fixed-Prices Multipliers Underlying the Growth and Welfare Inference, 
from the 1995/96 Financial SAM for IMMPA - Folio 6/6 
Exports  Capital Accounts of Economic Agents  Endogenous Changes in Assets 
and Liabilities 


















































































































































































































































































































































RESSOURCES  No.  34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 48 49 51 
Non Traded Rural Production  26  .02 .01 .01 .04 .01 -.02 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00









Urban Corporate Production  28  .45 .41 .44 .44 .46 .42 .00  .00 .00 .57 .00 .00 .00 .00
Non Traded Rural Production  29  .91 .52 .54 1.89 .59 -.97 .00  .00 .00 .10 .00 .00 .00 .00
Traded Rural Production  30  .11 .10 .13 .11 1.14 .16 .00  .00 .00 -.02 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Informal Production  31  1.70 1.40 1.44 1.66 1.57 3.58 .00  .00 .00 1.40 .00 .00 .00 .00




























Public Sector Production  33  .07 .05 .05 .06 .05 .05 .00  .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .00 .00
Non Traded Rural Production  34  1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00









Urban Corporate Production  36  .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Non Traders Households  37  .01 .01 .00 1.01 .01 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Rural Traders Households  38  .01 .00 .00 .01 1.00 .00 .00  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unsk. Informal Households  39  .06 .05 .06 .06 .06 1.08 .00  .00 .00 .05 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Unsk. Formal Households  40  .03 .02 .03 .02 .02 .04 1.00  .00 .00 .02 .00 .00 .00 .00
Urban Skilled Households  41  .02 .02 .04 .02 .02 .02 .00  1.00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 .00
Capitalistic Households  42  .07 .06 .07 .07 .07 .09 .00  .00 1.00 .05 .00 .00 .00 .00





































Commercial Banks  44  .02 .02 .02 .02 .07 .05 .04  .03 .02 -.02 1.00 .00 1.00 .00
Fiduciary Currencies  48  -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.09 -.05 -.06  -.05 -.03 -.01 .00 1.00 .00 .00



































Bank Reserves  51  .01 .01 .01 .01 .03 .02 .01  .01 .01 -.01 .40 .00 .40 1.00
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Annex V-B: Exogenous Accounts for Growth and Welfare Inference under Fixed-
Prices Multipliers Assumptions 
Account Rubric  Account 
Number (*)  Account Name 
13 Central  Bank 
14 Central  Government 
Current Accounts of 
Economic Agents 
15  Rest Of the World 
45 Central  Bank 
46 Central  Government  Capital Accounts of 
Economic Agents 
47  Rest Of the World 
50  Special Deposits to Central Bank 
52 Capital  Shares 
53  Credits allowed by Commercial Banks 
54  Bills issued by Government 
55  Advances of Central Bank to the Treasury 
56  State Consolidated Credits allowed by the Central Bank 
57  Commercial Bank Refinancing allocated by the Central Bank 
58 External  Engagements 
Change in Assets 
and Liabilities 
59  External Financial Resources 
(*) Accounts have the same numbering as in the financial SAM (see Annex I). 